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SEX, THREATS, AND ABSENT VICTIMS:  THE 
LESSONS OF REGINA V. BEDINGFIELD FOR 




In 2004, Crawford v. Washington, authored by Justice Scalia, 
revolutionized the law of confrontation by requiring that, aside from two 
discrete exceptions, all testimonial statements (those made with the 
expectation that they will serve to prosecute the accused) be subject to 
cross-examination.  This new interpretation of the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause has profoundly affected domestic violence cases, 
making it much harder to prosecute them successfully. 
Although Justice Scalia’s approach to confrontation is new, it is 
strikingly similar to the analysis in Regina v. Bedingfield, a notorious 
English murder case, which excluded from the evidence an alleged 
statement by the murder victim.  The analysis of the res gestae hearsay 
exception, which was central to excluding the victim’s statement in 
Bedingfield, focused on the timing of her statement, her intent in making it, 
and whether an ongoing emergency existed when the declaration was made.  
Justice Scalia’s rigid, formalistic approach to testimonial statements in 
Davis v. Washington, another in the line of new confrontation cases, is 
analogous and ultimately as confusing and unworkable as Bedingfield’s res 
gestae analysis. 
Although Bedingfield arose in 1879, its facts, replete with verbal abuse, 
intoxication, unheeded pleas for police protection, and ultimately, murder 
when the victim tried to break off the relationship, resonate with modern 
experiences of domestic violence.  Both the Bedingfield case and Justice 
Scalia’s confrontation jurisprudence fail to account for the practical 
realities of domestic violence cases and ignore the voices of victims who 
cannot or will not testify on their own behalf.  The facts of Bedingfield, 
which present a serious question whether the victim’s statement was ever 
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uttered, demonstrate another flaw in Justice Scalia’s new approach.  In 
addition to being too rigid in rejecting unconfronted testimonial statements, 
the new confrontation doctrine is also too lax regarding nontestimonial 
statements, which now receive no constitutional protection at all. 
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“Oh, aunt, see what Bedingfield has done to me.”1  This was the 
declaration of Eliza Rudd, a widow and owner of a laundry service, as she 
 
 1. Murder and Attempted Suicide at Ipswich, IPSWICH J., July 12, 1879, at 7, available 
at Gale, Doc. No. Y3202578458.  Rudd’s phrase has been reported with slight variations. 
See The Ipswich Tragedy, IPSWICH J., Sept. 20, 1879, at 7, available at Gale, Doc. No. 
Y3202579060 (“Dear Aunt, look what Bedingfield has done to me” from Sarah Rodwell, 
and another version from a passing-by ten-year-old, John Arthur Shimmon, “Oh, dear, Aunt, 
look here what Bedingfield has done to me.”).  According to the case reporter, it was, “See 
what Harry has done!” R v. Bedingfield, (1879) 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 341 (Crown Ct.) at 345 
n.(b) (Eng.). But cf. James B. Thayer, Bedingfield’s Case.—Declarations as a Part of the 
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emerged from her private room with her throat slashed early one Tuesday 
morning in July 1879.2  When the police arrived, Rudd was unable to speak, 
but she pointed to the room where her accused killer and lover, Henry 
Bedingfield, was found unconscious with his own throat cut.3  Rudd died a 
few minutes after the police arrived.4  At trial, Bedingfield, who survived, 
claimed that Eliza Rudd had attempted to kill him, and then killed herself.5  
Despite his plea of innocence, the jury convicted Bedingfield after seven 
minutes of deliberation, and he was hanged before the end of the year.6 
The content of Rudd’s statement was never admitted.7  According to the 
court, Rudd’s declaration was neither part of the res gestae8 nor a dying 
declaration, and hence fell within the category of inadmissible hearsay.9  
Despite the guilty verdict, the exclusion of Rudd’s declaration raised a 
furor, generating angry letters to the Times of London, various pamphlets 
both criticizing and defending the decision, and a three-part article by the 
American evidence luminary James B. Thayer.10 
Bedingfield has everything:  sex, threats, gore, femicide, and dramatic 
statements that might actually never have been uttered.  In addition to its 
obvious drama and contentiousness, however, Bedingfield illuminates vital 
issues in evidence law, especially those surrounding declarations by victims 
of domestic violence who are unavailable to testify.  Domestic violence 
cases, especially those that end in murder, continue to present special 
challenges for evidence law; 130 years later, too little has changed in the 
lives of women who experience intimate partner violence and must deal 
with the law’s inadequate response.  Bedingfield raises questions 
concerning the use of out-of-court statements by absent declarants and the 
victim’s right to “speak from the grave”—all of which mirror thorny issues 
in modern evidence law.  Had the Bedingfield case occurred today, it 
certainly would not have been settled with the same alacrity.  Yet, the case 
 
Res Gesta (pt. I), 14 AM. L. REV. 817, 826 (1880) (following concurrent news reports of the 
statement as being “O aunt, see what has been done to me”). 
 2. Murder and Attempted Suicide at Ipswich, supra note 1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. The Ipswich Tragedy, supra note 1. 
 5. Bedingfield, 14 Cox. Crim. Cas. at 344. 
 6. The Ipswich Murder.—Sentence of Death, IPSWICH J., Nov. 15, 1879, at 7, available 
at Gale, Doc. No. Y3203579514.  The determination of guilt was based primarily on forensic 
evidence. See infra notes 84–88 and accompanying text. 
 7. Bedingfield, 14 Cox Crim. Cas. at 344–45.  However, the fact that Rudd made a 
statement shortly after the incident was briefly mentioned in the opinion as refuting the 
defendant’s suicide theory. Id. 
 8. Res gestae literally means “things done.” Infra note 28.  It is a common-law concept 
that excepts from the hearsay definition acts done and statements made that accompany an 
event. See Jeffery L. Fisher, What Happened—And What is Happening—to the 
Confrontation Clause?, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 587, 601 (2007) (defining res gestae as “those 
circumstances which are the automatic and undisguised incidents of a particular litigated act, 
and which are admissible when illustrative of such act” (citation omitted)). 
 9. Bedingfield, 14 Cox. Crim. Cas. at 342–43. 
 10. See Thayer, supra note 1; James B. Thayer, Bedingfield’s Case.—Declarations as a 
Part of the Res Gesta (pts. II & III), 15 AM. L. REV. 1, 71 (1881).  For a discussion of 
Thayer’s contribution to the modern evidence law and scholarship, see Eleanor Swift, One 
Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform:  Thayer’s Triumph, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2437 (2000). 
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would pose many of the same difficult questions of relations between the 
sexes, motive for murder, proof of guilt, admissibility of evidence, and even 
the wisdom of the death penalty.  Today, however, we would also have to 
consider the U.S. Supreme Court’s new Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence.  Although itself not a confrontation case, Bedingfield offers 
important insights into our current Sixth Amendment debates. 
Part I of this Article presents the Bedingfield case, assesses the reliability 
of Rudd’s famous statement, and analyzes the res gestae issue central to 
Bedingfield.  Part II presents the changes in modern confrontation 
jurisprudence with a focus on domestic-violence prosecutions.  Part II 
briefly presents the Supreme Court’s new confrontation jurisprudence, 
which requires, with two limited exceptions, that all testimonial statements 
must be cross-examined.  Part II then defines domestic violence, reviews 
the lively and important debate about “no-drop” prosecutions, and explains 
the significant practical effects of the new jurisprudence of domestic-
violence cases. 
Part III demonstrates how the res gestae hearsay exception, central in 
Bedingfield, illuminates the various difficult questions posed by the Court’s 
new confrontation jurisprudence.  The practical realities of domestic-
violence cases undermine the logic and theory of the new confrontation 
jurisprudence, challenging the easy dualisms and neat categories that 
undergird both the old res gestae doctrine and the Court’s new approach.  
Part III argues that Bedingfield’s res gestae analysis is strikingly similar to 
the Court’s approach to testimonial statements and is equally unworkable.  
This Part explores how both Bedingfield and our modern confrontation 
jurisprudence fail to hear the voices of victims who cannot or will not 
testify on their own behalf.  Part III also notes the ironies, absurdities, and 
unintended consequences of the Court’s rigid approach. 
Part IV uses Bedingfield to argue that the Court’s sole focus on 
testimonial statements, and its refusal to consider issues of reliability, may 
readily admit many unconfronted statements that are questionable and 
unfair to the accused.  Because there is a serious question whether the 
controversial statement in Bedingfield was ever made, the case illustrates 
the dangers of such unconfronted testimony and the troubling fact that, 
under the new confrontation jurisprudence, nontestimonial statements 
receive no constitutional protection at all.  Taken together, Parts III and IV 
rely on Bedingfield to make the case that the Court’s new approach to 
confrontation is both too rigid in rejecting the admission of all unconfronted 
testimonial statements and too lax regarding nontestimonial statements.  
Interestingly, this mirrors the criticism leveled at res gestae at the end of the 
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, which was 
simultaneously criticized both for its rigidity of application and for allowing 
too many unconfronted and unreliable declarations into evidence. 
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I.  THE BEDINGFIELD CASE 
A.  The Reported Opinion 
Rudd is never named in the reported opinion,11 but instead is identified as 
a “woman at Ipswich” and referred to as “she” or “the deceased.”12  We 
learn that the unnamed deceased is a widow, laundress, employer (she has 
two assistants), and fornicator.13  We infer that last fact because the 
prisoner “had relations with the deceased woman,”14 and the court implies 
that they were intimate.  Bedingfield, though named, is mostly referred to as 
“the prisoner.”15  His occupation and marital status are not presented by the 
opinion.16  He lived with his wife approximately a half-mile away from 
Rudd.17 
The conflict between the accused and the victim arose when Bedingfield 
“had conceived a violent resentment against her on account of her refusing 
him something he very much desired, and also as appearing to wish to put 
an end to these relations.”18  Conflict had obviously arisen before.  
Bedingfield “had uttered violent threats against her, and had distinctly 
threatened to kill her by cutting her throat.”19  Rudd was sufficiently 
frightened that she asked a “policeman to keep his eye on her house.”20  
The policemen “heard the voice of a man in great anger” around ten o’clock 
at night at Rudd’s house.21 
Early the next morning, Bedingfield returned to Rudd’s house, where 
they were alone for a while.  He went out to a “spirit shop” and Rudd was 
found by one of her assistants lying on the floor, “her head resting on a 
footstool.”22  Upon returning from the spirit shop, Bedingfield entered 
Rudd’s room where Rudd remained.23  Rudd’s assistants were in the yard.24  
 
 11. Regina v. Bedingfield is reported in Volume XIV of the Reports of Cases in Criminal 
Law, which covers cases from 1877 to 1882.  The reporter, W.F. Finlason, Esq., Barrister-at-
Law, provides a mixture of factual summary and paragraphs that purport to recount 
statements made by Lord Chief Justice Alexander Cockburn.  In addition, the reporter 
provides footnotes explicating legal questions, expanding on the facts, and discussing the 
legal strategies of the parties.  Because the reporters, not the judges themselves, transcribed 
the oral opinions, such records may not be as accurate in conveying the judge’s remarks as 
are modern reporters.  By this, I do not mean to imply that modern courts always get the 
facts right, merely that they document their factual assumptions, reasoning, and an agreed 
version of events and arguments form the template of modern courts’ legal determinations. 
 12. Bedingfield, 14 Cox Crim. Cas. at 341. 
 13. See id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See generally id. 
 17. The Ipswich Murder.—Sentence of Death, supra note 6. 
 18. Bedingfield, 14 Cox. Crim. Cas. at 341. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 342. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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A minute or two later, “the deceased came suddenly out of the house 
towards the women with her throat cut.”25 
Interestingly, in the reports of the remarks of Lord Chief Justice 
Alexander Cockburn, the court never recounted the disputed statement 
itself.  Rather, Chief Justice Cockburn mentioned almost coyly that, after 
Rudd emerged from the house with her throat cut, Rudd “said something, 
pointing backwards to the house” to her female employee.26  One has to 
read the notes of the court reporter, various newspaper accounts, or 
Thayer’s critique to learn Rudd’s alleged statement, “Oh, aunt, see what 
Bedingfield has done to me.”27 
Bedingfield considered and rejected two distinct theories for admitting 
Rudd’s statement.  First, it discussed whether the statement was part of the 
res gestae.  This concept refers to words spoken, thoughts expressed, and 
gestures made “immediately following [an act] and so closely connected 
with it as to form in reality a part of the occurrence.”28  Chief Justice 
Cockburn held that res gestae did not apply because the timing was off.  He 
explained that Rudd’s cry “was not part of anything done, or something said 
while something was being done, but something said after something 
done.”29  By contrast, a statement uttered by the deceased “at the time the 
act was being done would be admissible, as, for instance, if she had been 
heard to say something, as ‘Don’t, Harry!’  But here it was something stated 
by her after it was all over . . . and after the act was completed.”30 
Second, Bedingfield refused to admit Rudd’s final words as a dying 
declaration.  It held that Rudd was insufficiently aware of her impending 
death to have formed the correct state of mind to qualify for the 
exception.31  Given the state of medicine in 1879, it might seem odd that 
someone with blood spewing out of her jugular vein, thyroid arteries cut, 
and her trachea severed would have any doubt she was a goner, but 
according to Chief Justice Cockburn, things just happened too fast.32 
 
B.  Various Contemporary Accounts and Commentaries 
Because the reported cases of Bedingfield’s era present serious 
limitations, it is particularly useful to consult other sources for the facts and 
legal disputes in the case.  The contemporary accounts provide much 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Murder and Attempted Suicide at Ipswich, supra note 1. 
 28. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1423 (9th ed. 2009) (quoting State v. Fouquette, 221 
P.2d 404, 416–17 (Nev. 1950)).  Res gestae literally means “things done.” Id.; see Fisher, 
supra note 8. 
 29. Bedingfield, 14 Cox Crim. at 342. 
 30. Id. at 342–43. 
 31. Id. at 343 (holding that the statement was not admissible because “it did not appear 
that the woman was aware that she was dying”). 
 32. Id. at 344.  Justice Cockburn is quoted as saying of Rudd:  “[S]he had no time to 
consider and reflect that she was dying; there is no evidence to show that she knew it, and I 
cannot presume it.” Id. 
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additional information, occasionally shedding a very different light on the 
facts.33  First, we learn more about the dramatis personae.  Eliza Rudd was 
forty-five years old when she died,34 and Bedingfield was forty-six when 
the incident occurred.35  The state’s key witness was Rudd’s employee, 
Sarah Rodwell.36  Other witnesses included various neighbors, policemen, 
Rodwell’s son,37 and a ten-year-old boy, who testified before the 
magistrates that he walked past Rudd’s house the morning of the murder on 
his way to school, saw Rudd and Rodwell, and claimed that he heard Rudd 
say, “Oh, dear, Aunt, look here what Bedingfield has done to me.”38 
We learn that Bedingfield had been a friend of Rudd’s late husband, who 
had died two years previously.39  Bedingfield, out of proclaimed loyalty to 
his deceased friend, continued to look out for Eliza Rudd, and “undertook 
to see that Mrs. Rudd was not imposed upon.”40  Bedingfield clearly had 
business associations with Rudd, keeping pigs in her yard,41 hanging and 
taking in laundry,42 and delivering the laundry with Rudd’s pony and trap 
(cart) around the neighborhood.43  He complained that he was underpaid 
and unappreciated.44 
Bedingfield was married and claimed that he, his wife, and Rudd often 
took meals together.45  Apparently, meals were not all they shared.  
According to a policeman who took a statement, Bedingfield said:  “She 
have kissed me in the presence of my wife, and told me that she loved me 
better than she ever loved her husband.”46  Leaving nothing to the 
 
 33. Newspaper accounts occurred primarily in The Ipswich Journal, which dedicated 
lots of coverage to this hometown murder.  Ipswich, one of England’s oldest towns, served 
as the main center between York and London for North Sea trade, and was the setting for 
Charles Dickens’s The Pickwick Papers. CHARLES DICKENS, THE POSTHUMOUS PAPERS OF 
THE PICKWICK CLUB ch. xxii (The Heritage Press 1938) (1837).  The London papers carried 
shorter squibs about the crime, but were more engaged in the post-conviction legal 
wrangling and pleas for clemency. 
 34. Murder and Attempted Suicide at Ipswich, supra note 1. 
 35. The Execution of Henry Bedingfield, IPSWICH J., Dec. 6, 1879, at 10, available at 
Gale, Doc. No. Y3202579710. 
 36. See The Ipswich Tragedy, supra note 1. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.  It is unclear from the newspaper report whether this is the gloss of the journalist 
or somehow gleaned from the statements of the prosecuting attorney. Henry Bedingfield, 
IPSWICH J., Dec. 9, 1879, at 2, available at Gale, Doc. No. Y3202579719 (“He had promised 
his victim’s husband, in some way or other, that he would look after her and assist her when 
she was left alone.”). 
 41. The Ipswich Tragedy, supra note 1 (voluntary statement made by Bedingfield to 
police while he was in the hospital). 
 42. The Execution of Henry Bedingfield, supra note 35. 
 43. Id. 
 44. The Ipswich Tragedy, supra note 1 (“[S]he had money from me every week, and 
what work I done for her, twenty pounds would not pay me.” (quoting Bedingfield)). 
 45. Id. (“Me and my wife frequently had supper at hers, and she frequently had tea at 
ours.” (as quoted by the police officer who took a statement from Bedingfield at the 
hospital)). 
 46. Id.  The prisoner was not entitled to testify at the inquest or the trial, but his 
voluntary statements to the police were reported in the papers. 
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imagination, Bedingfield added:  “We have been as man and wife together; 
we have slept together, and she have been towards two children by me.”47 
At the magistrate’s inquest, a policeman testified that he had been called 
to Rudd’s house the night before her murder.48  According to Bedingfield, 
he visited Rudd the next morning because he needed to borrow one pound, 
and his wife would not give it to him.49  Per Rudd’s request, he brought her 
a razor to cut away her corns (thereby explaining the presence of the 
instrument of Rudd’s death).50  Although it is not at all clear from the 
reported opinion, all contemporaneous versions of the events concur that 
after a brief conversation with Rudd, Bedingfield departed to get her some 
brandy after Rudd had fainted during an argument.51  The court’s account 
of “her refusing him something he very much desired”52 might seem to 
modern ears to be a delicate way of describing an argument over sexual 
favors, but there is general concurrence among the various newspaper 
sources that the two fought over the use of Rudd’s pony and trap.53 
In Bedingfield’s version of events, Rudd flew into a jealous rage when he 
told her of yet a third woman whom he had impregnated.54  She slapped 
him and while he was sitting on her lap, ostensibly facing forward, she cut 
his throat with the razor he had brought.55  He claimed:  “I never cut her 
throat; she cut her’s and mine too.  I was sitting on her knee; she cut my 
throat, and I fell down on the floor unconscious.”56 
Throughout, Bedingfield repeatedly proclaimed his innocence, asking, 
“Do you think I could do that deed, as good friends as we were?”57  He also 
expressed surprise:  “I did not think she would have done such a thing.  She 
 
 47. Id.  There is no record of any children from their affair, so it is probable that Rudd 
miscarried. 
 48. Id. 
 49. The Ipswich Murder.—Sentence of Death, supra note 6.  Bedingfield told a 
policeman that he first asked his wife for one pound, but she refused. Id.  Bedingfield added 
that “if it had not been for my wife perhaps that [Rudd’s supposed attack on Bedingfield] 
would never have occurred.” Id. 
 50. The Ipswich Tragedy, supra note 1. 
 51. Murder and Attempted Suicide at Ipswich, supra note 1. 
 52. R v. Bedingfield, (1879) 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 341 (Crown Ct.) at 341 (Eng.). 
 53. The Ipswich Tragedy, supra note 1 (noting that even Bedingfield himself alludes to 
this when he commented that “if she had given me the pony and cart it would not have paid 
me for what I have done for her”). 
 54. Bedingfield is quoted by the policeman as reporting the following conversation 
between himself and Rudd: 
Bedingfield:  “You know a young woman had a child by me.” 
Rudd:  “I heard so.” 
Bedingfield is then reported to have said to the policeman to whom he gave the statement 
that “Mrs. Rudd told me if she knew I spoke to [the young woman] again, she would run a 
knife into me.  She has slapped my face—that the women know [possibly referring to 
Rudd’s assistants]—and if she had given me the pony and cart it would not have paid me for 
what I have done for her.” Id. 
 55. The direction of the cut on Bedingfield could only be explained if they were both 
facing the same direction—something the lap sitting would have accounted for. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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was a deceitful woman.”58  In the accounts of Bedingfield’s final moments 
before his execution, Bedingfield continued to proclaim his innocence.59  
The actual execution, the first in Ipswich since 1863, sixteen years 
previously, was closed to the general public.60  But a reporter assured the 
readers of The Ipswich Journal that:  “We have, however, good reason for 
knowing that the wretched man made no confession.  On the contrary, that 
to the last he persisted in his innocence, and insisted that justice had not 
been done him.”61 
C.  What Happened in Ipswich?  Evaluation of the Evidence and 
Bedingfield’s Guilt 
Justice was swift for Bedingfield, but, according to some, not necessarily 
sure.  The coroner’s inquest was held the same day Rudd died.62  
Bedingfield was tried and convicted on November 13, 1879, and hanged on 
December 3, 1879.63  One would never guess from the reported opinion or 
the arguments over evidence that, in addition to the flap about the 
admissibility of Rudd’s final statement, there was significant concern about 
justice for Bedingfield.  Over six hundred people signed a petition to the 
Home Office praying for a commutation of Bedingfield’s sentence, though 
some of those making the request may have been motivated by opposition 
to the death penalty, rather than belief in Bedingfield’s innocence.64 
The Reverend Samuel Garratt, vicar of St. Margaret’s Church in Ipswich, 
wrote a long letter to several of the London papers pleading for clemency.65  
Interestingly, he first death-qualified himself,66 explaining that he did 
“believe death by man’s hands to be the Divinely-appointed punishment for 
murder.”67  The Vicar wrote passionately of Bedingfield’s innocence:  “I 
am so convinced that he has been convicted under a mistake that I dare not 
be silent.”68 
The arguments against Bedingfield’s guilt mustered by the Vicar 
concerned motive, the physical circumstances, and the creation of 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. The Execution of Henry Bedingfield, supra note 35. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Murder and Attempted Suicide at Ipswich, supra note 1. 
 63. The Execution of Henry Bedingfield, supra note 35. 
 64. The Ipswich Murder, DAILY NEWS (London), Dec. 1, 1879, at 3, available at Gale, 
Doc. No. Y3203348238. 
 65. Samuel Garratt, Letter to the Editor, The Bedingfield Case, DAILY NEWS (London), 
Nov. 29, 1879, at 2, available at Gale, Doc. No. Y3203348198; see The Condemned Man 
Henry Bedingfield, IPSWICH J., Dec. 2, 1879, at 4, available at Gale, Doc. No. Y3202579678.  
 66. To “death qualify” in modern parlance means to agree in principle with the death 
penalty.  In capital cases, prosecutors are allowed to excuse for cause jurors who are not 
death-qualified. See generally Sam Kamin & Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Death Qualification and the 
True Bifurcation:  Building on the Massachusetts Governor’s Council’s Work, 80 IND. L.J. 
131 (2005). 
 67. Garratt, supra note 65. 
 68. Id.  The Vicar stated that “Bedingfield has not been proved guilty, nor do I think he 
is guilty.” Id. 
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reasonable doubt.69  The Vicar questioned why Bedingfield had committed 
his crime during the day with plenty of witnesses, when he could have 
murdered Rudd the night before.70  The Vicar claimed that no motive had 
been demonstrated for Bedingfield to murder Rudd, whereas Bedingfield 
had assigned a motive for Rudd to attack him.71  Bedingfield, according to 
the Vicar, seemed tenderly concerned about Rudd’s welfare and even 
“fetch[ed] her a cordial because she was faint and ill—a strange precursor 
to cutting her throat.”72  According to the Vicar, when Rudd was pointing to 
the back room where Bedingfield lay, it was “not to denounce him as a 
murderer, but to implore help for him.”73 
The Vicar from Ipswich, in protesting the innocence of Bedingfield, 
made another observation worth considering.  He was convinced that “what 
really influenced the minds of the jury was the evidence ruled by the Lord 
Chief Justice to be inadmissible, but which probably all of them had heard, 
and which . . . if admitted, [would] be fatal to the prisoner.”74  This is a 
reference to the impact of Rudd’s alleged final statement, which the Vicar 
believed was inappropriately influential on the jury because of its emotional 
power.  Rudd’s alleged statement had been quoted extensively (with minor 
variations) in the newspapers so it is not fanciful to think, as the Vicar 
clearly did, that the jurors may have heard about Rudd’s statement outside 
the courtroom.  Even in 1879, apparently, people legitimately wondered if 
sensational cases covered in the press could be fair and truly tried. 
Significantly, the Vicar also contested the forensic evidence, pointing out 
that Bedingfield’s claim that he was sitting on Rudd’s lap explains the 
direction of the incision.75  He cited evidence from the Coroner’s inquest 
that the depth of Rudd’s wound would have prevented her from talking at 
all, and any accounts of what she said would necessarily be a fabrication.76 
Furthermore, the testimony of Sarah Rodwell, the primary witness to the 
famous and controversial statement, “Oh, aunt, see what Bedingfield has 
done to me,”77 invites questions about Rodwell’s veracity.  At the 
Coroner’s Inquest, which, as noted above, happened the same day as the 
murder, Rodwell said under oath: 
Bedingfield has been backwards and forwards to the deceased’s house for 
the past two years to see after [Rudd’s] pony and other business matters.  
He was paid for the services he thus rendered.  I know of no other reason 
for his visits, and I always understood there was a good feeling existing 
between the parties.  I never heard him threaten to do violence to her, nor 
have I heard her threaten to use any violence whatever against herself.  As 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Murder and Attempted Suicide at Ipswich, supra note 1. 
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to the cause of the injuries on the deceased’s body I cannot give any 
evidence.78 
By the time of the magistrate’s inquest in September, however, Rodwell 
had a specific and very relevant memory of Bedingfield’s violent threat 
against Rudd.  Rodwell was the only one to allege that Bedingfield 
threatened Rudd the night before,79 claiming that Bedingfield said:  “Before 
you shall have anybody come here in my place I’ll cut your —— throat.”80  
How do we explain the discrepancy?  One possibility is that at the time of 
the Coroner’s Inquest, the very day of Rudd’s death, Rodwell was shaken.  
More probably, Rodwell was trying to protect Rudd’s reputation and to 
keep the sexual nature of Bedingfield and Rudd’s relationship under wraps.  
There is also, however, the possibility that Bedingfield never threatened 
Rudd with cutting her throat at all, and this was just Rodwell’s way of 
securing Bedingfield’s conviction.81 
Persuasive as the impeachment of Rodwell is, arguments about 
Bedingfield’s lack of motive, however, are wildly unconvincing.  As one 
newspaper commentary brilliantly observed:  “[W]hen the parties are man 
and wife, no additional motive for murder need be sought, and though 
Bedingfield and Mrs. Rudd were not man and wife, yet they were living in 
an equally close relation of a less legitimate kind.”82  Clearly, when people 
are emotionally entangled and in a sexual relationship, one does not need to 
search far for murderous impulses.  Furthermore, there appeared to be 
significant evidence concerning constant fighting between Rudd and 
Bedingfield.83 
Similarly, the forensic arguments for innocence are unpersuasive.  
Medical experts testified that Rudd’s wound could not have been self-
inflicted and that Bedingfield had wielded the razor that cut both their 
throats.84  A surgeon who was on the scene to pronounce Rudd’s death also 
performed a post-mortem examination and testified that the injury was not 
self-inflicted because of the “[g]reat violence [which] must have been 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. The Ipswich Tragedy, supra note 1. 
 80. Id.  I am guessing that the excised word that the paper would not print is “damn.”  
This testimony is picked up by the court in the opinion, and Rodwell was cross-examined by 
the defense attorney at trial regarding her testimony at the Coroner’s inquest. 
 81. Another possible indication of Rodwell’s lack of veracity is that her own son, James 
Rodwell, age sixteen, contradicted her version of that morning’s events, challenging his 
mother’s assertion that Bedingfield had been the subject of discussion at the breakfast table. 
Murder and Attempted Suicide at Ipswich, supra note 1. 
 82. DAILY NEWS (London), Nov. 15, 1879, at 5, available at Gale, Doc. No. 
Y3203347839 (untitled article beginning “The murder of Eliza Rudd by Henry Bedingfield”) 
(attributing the quote to Stephen’s Evidence). 
 83. The Ipswich Murder.—Sentence of Death, supra note 6 (discussing the “standing 
quarrel” concerning payment for Bedingfield’s services). 
 84. R v. Bedingfield, (1879) 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 341 (Crown Ct.) at 344 (Eng.).  To 
credit Bedingfield’s claim of innocence, one would have to believe that Rudd pulled out the 
razor while Bedingfield was sitting on her lap.  Rudd’s son testified before the magistrates 
that Rudd had bad knees and could not have supported a fully grown man on her lap. The 
Ipswich Tragedy, supra note 1. 
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used.”85  By contrast, Bedingfield’s wound was shallower (hence his 
survival) and “was of the character common in suicidal wounds.”86 
The razor identified as the weapon used to slash Bedingfield and Rudd 
was found curled in Bedingfield’s bloody fingers; a matching razor was 
found in his pocket.87  As the prosecutor observed to the magistrates, “It 
was a most ridiculous suggestion that the woman could cut her own head 
nearly off and then lean over the prisoner and place a razor in his hand in 
the manner in which it was found.”88  The prosecutor had a point; nowhere 
does the Vicar deal with the problem of the razor in Bedingfield’s hand. 
Ultimately, the facts leave one with the impression that Bedingfield was 
indeed guilty of murder.  The forensic evidence, primitive by modern 
standards, nevertheless seems highly persuasive.  Indeed, in all the 
subsequent evidentiary commentaries that argue about the admissibility of 
the famous statement, “Oh, aunt, see what Bedingfield has done to me,”89 
Bedingfield’s guilt is presumed.  It is the admissibility of this statement, 
rather than Bedingfield’s innocence or guilt that is central to this case’s 
place in evidence history. 
Yet, the facts of the case raise an interesting question whether the 
statement was ever made.  Serious questions exist regarding the credibility 
of Rodwell, the chief witness to the statement.  Even more troubling, the 
Vicar and others made a persuasive argument that, with her throat cut so 
severely, it was unlikely that Rudd could talk at all.  Both surgeons who 
testified at the inquest so opined, though they later retreated a bit upon 
cross-examination.  One said:  “In that condition, I should say it was 
impossible for her to have uttered an exclamation.”90  The second testified 
that in his opinion, Rudd “could not have spoken with her head in any 
position whatever. . . . I think there would be nothing more than a sound of 
wind rushing through the windpipe.  The muscles of the larynx being 
 
 85. Murder and Attempted Suicide at Ipswich, supra note 1.  Dr. Webster Adams 
testified that he found Rudd “with a deep incised wound in the throat, extending obliquely 
from the left up towards the right ear, severing all the large vessels on the right side, also the 
trachea.” Id.  He opined that “the wound was inflicted from behind by the right hand, as the 
wound under the left ear is superficial, but as it progresses towards the right ear the wound 
becomes very deep.” Id.  A few months later, Dr. Adams gave similar testimony in front of 
the magistrates, but he said that he “could not say whether much violence was used in 
inflicting [the] wound.” The Ipswich Tragedy, supra note 1.  Branford Edwards, another 
surgeon who also attended the post-mortem and who testified at the Coroner’s Inquest, 
similarly testified that it “probably was not a suicidal wound.” Id.  In addition, Rudd did not 
seem the type to take her own life.  Dr. Adams knew Rudd personally (she was his 
laundress) and noted that “[t]he woman was always very cheerful, and I never thought her of 
a suicidal tendency.” Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Murder and Attempted Suicide at Ipswich, supra note 1. 
 90. The Murder at Ipswich, IPSWICH J., July 19, 1879, at 3, available at Gale, Doc. No. 
Y3202578524 (statement of Dr. Webster Adams); accord Garratt, supra note 65 (quoting the 
Doctor’s statement). 
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divided she lost the strength to articulate.”91  These doctors also predicted 
Bedingfield would die of his wounds,92 so clearly they did not know 
everything.  Nevertheless, the infirmity of Rodwell as a witness, whose 
recollection one scholar deems “strikingly convenient,”93 and the medical 
testimony lead to the conclusion that Rudd’s statement was manufactured. 
If it is true, as I suspect, that Rudd actually said nothing, this absence of 
utterance is more than an historical irony—another academic argument over 
nothing.  If, indeed, Rudd never uttered these famous words, it was 
especially fortunate that they were never introduced.  The rule against 
hearsay did its job of protecting the jury from hearing manufactured, out-of-
court statements.  Ultimately, however, the truth of what happened in 
Ipswich in 1879 is overshadowed by the evidence arguments spurred by 
those events. 
D.  Res Gestae Analysis 
Rudd’s statement, “Oh, aunt, see what Bedingfield has done,”94 presents 
a classic example of hearsay.  Rudd made her statement out of court and the 
prosecution wanted to offer it for the truth of the matter asserted, which is 
to say, that Bedingfield had done the deed of cutting her throat.  As with 
many out-of-court statements, there is some ambiguity, and Rudd was dead 
so she could not clarify its meaning.95  Historically, however, there has 
been little debate as to the meaning of Rudd’s famous utterance,96 and 
instead scholars and jurists debated whether her statement was admissible 
as part of the res gestae to prove Bedingfield’s attack. 
Statements that qualify as part of the res gestae were connected so 
closely to the event that they were deemed part of the action, and hence 
admissible despite the hearsay rule.  Courts struggled with the definition of 
res gestae, a term that, according to Professor Charles T. McCormick, 
began to be cited in the early 1800s.97  Professor John Pitt Taylor, in his 
evidence treatise, explained the central question:  “[W]hether the 
circumstances and declarations offered in proof were so connected with the 
 
 91. The Murder at Ipswich, supra note 90 (statement of Dr. Branford Edwards).  This 
statement was also quoted by the Vicar in his letter to the editor. Garratt, supra note 65.  The 
Vicar’s quotations of the surgeons’ statements are slightly different from those reported in 
The Ipswich Journal article, but they contain the same information. Id. 
 92. Murder and Attempted Suicide at Ipswich, supra note 1. 
 93. David Wilde, Hearsay in Criminal Cases:  Res Gestae and Dying Declarations:  R v 
Bedingfield Revisited, 4 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 107, 115 n.33 (2000). 
 94. Murder and Attempted Suicide at Ipswich, supra note 1. 
 95. It is possible that Rudd meant something other than accusing Bedingfield of slitting 
her throat.  If one were to believe Bedingfield’s defense that Rudd attacked him and then she 
committed suicide, the statement, “Oh, aunt, see what Bedingfield has done to me” could 
mean “Oh, aunt, see what Bedingfield has driven me to do.” See David M. Tanovich, Starr 
Gazing:  Looking into the Future of Hearsay in Canada, 28 QUEEN’S L.J. 371, 405 (2003) 
(presenting this alternate hypothesis). 
 96. But see Wilde, supra note 93, 111–12 (arguing, based on an event involving Vincent 
van Gogh and Paul Gauguin, that Rudd could have been the aggressor and yet still blamed 
Bedingfield). 
 97. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 268 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). 
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main fact under consideration, as to illustrate its character, to further its 
object, or to form, in conjunction with it, one continuous transaction.”98 
The term res gestae captured the interest and inspired the ire of many 
evidence greats in addition to James Thayer, who decried its “convenient 
obscurity.”99  Edmund M. Morgan began his classic article, A Suggested 
Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae,100 by noting that 
“[t]he marvelous capacity of a Latin phrase to serve as a substitute for 
reasoning . . . [is] nowhere better illustrated than in the decisions dealing 
with the admissibility of evidence as ‘res gestae.’”101  Similarly, Judge 
Learned Hand remarked, “as for ‘res gestae,’ it is a phrase which has been 
accountable for so much confusion that it had best be denied any place 
whatever in legal terminology; if it means anything but an unwillingness to 
think at all, what it covers cannot be put in less intelligible terms.”102 
The dismissiveness and contempt of scholars for the phrase res gestae 
derives from two apparently opposite factors:  (1) the ambiguity of the 
phrase that led to over-inclusiveness whereby too many out-of-court 
statements were admitted; and (2) the perceived narrowness of the English 
approach that led to under-inclusiveness.  As I argue in Part III, the same 
contradictory problems beset the modern Supreme Court’s definition of 
testimonial statements.103 
As to ambiguity, Professor John Henry Wigmore, declaring the phrase 
res gestae to be “not only entirely useless, but even positively harmful,”104 
explained that “it invites the confusion of one rule with another and thus 
creates uncertainty as to the limitations of both.”105  In a fit of candor, 
 
 98. 1 JOHN PITT TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE:  AS ADMINISTERED IN 
ENGLAND AND IRELAND §§ 525, 526 (London, William Maxwell & Son, 7th ed. 1878) 
(quoted in Coffin v. Bradbury, 35 P. 715, 721 (Idaho 1894)); see also Washington v. State, 
118 So. 2d 650, 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (“‘Res Gestae,’ is a Latin term translated 
literally as ‘things done’; and it embraces the circumstances, facts, and declarations which 
are incident to the main fact or transaction and which are necessary to demonstrate its 
character.  It also includes words, declarations, and acts so closely connected with a main 
fact in issue as to constitute a part of the transaction.” (citing H.C. UNDERHILL, A TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 266, at 644 (5th ed. 1956))); Coffin, 35 P. at 721 
(explaining that res gestae statements are “declarations made, under circumstances to 
warrant the court in presuming that they grew out of the litigated issue, and illustrate the true 
character of the transaction, and were dependent upon it, were not designedly made, or 
devised for a self-serving purpose, are evidentiary facts, and are not within the general rule 
applicable to hearsay testimony”). 
 99. Thayer (pt. II), supra note 10, at 9; see Aviva Orenstein, “MY GOD!”:  A Feminist 
Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 159, 167 
n.16 (1997). 
 100. 31 YALE L.J. 229 (1922). 
 101. Id. at 229. 
 102. United States v. Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1944). 
 103. Ironically, Justice Scalia, author and promoter of the new approach to confrontation 
leveled the same criticism at the previous confrontation doctrine he overruled. See Crawford 
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004) (criticizing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), for 
being both too broad and too narrow). 
 104. 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1767, at 182 (3d ed. 1940). 
 105. Id. 
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however, one court acknowledged that this ambiguity was seductive in its 
malleability,106 explaining that “sometimes the shibboleth was an easy way 
for a practical-minded court to say, ‘We frankly can’t figure out whether the 
statement is admissible under Theory A or Theory B, but we don’t really 
care because it is admissible in either event.’”107  Courts clearly admitted 
valuable evidence under a res gestae theory when they could think of no 
other way of admitting out-of-court statements.  Like its descendant, the 
excited utterance, res gestae was the “garbage pail of hearsay exceptions,” 
the last place to dump evidence otherwise excluded by hearsay.108 
Interestingly, the other criticism of res gestae was that courts applied it 
too grudgingly.  No small amount of this negative assessment of res gestae 
derives from Bedingfield itself and other cases like it in which the use of res 
gestae, particularly in the English cases, seemed picayune and 
unnecessarily restrictive.  According to Chief Justice Cockburn, Rudd’s 
declaration failed to fit into the category of res gestae because her statement 
was not exactly concurrent with the crime; the act by the perpetrator was 
already complete, and the statement was not made in the presence of the 
accused.109  Apparently, precise contemporaneity was vital in Bedingfield.  
As Cockburn explained, a statement like “Don’t, Harry!” would constitute 
part of the res gestae.110  “Look what Harry did,” however, would just be 
an inadmissible remembrance of things past.111 
 
 106. Gray v. State, 456 A.2d 1290, 1297 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (“One almost longs 
nostalgically for the discredited label of ‘res gestae,’ notwithstanding its utter repudiation in 
polite academic circles.  Its sin was its elusive ambiguity.  Ironically, that ambiguity may 
also have been its occasional virtue.” (footnote omitted)). 
 107. Id. at 1298. 
 108. Orenstein, supra note 99, at 177; see Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing 
Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 271, 282 (2006) (“The exception for excited 
utterances was the single most important evidentiary rule for prosecutors in domestic 
violence cases during the era preceding Crawford.”). 
 109. R v. Bedingfield, (1879) 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 341 (Crown Ct.) at 342 (Eng.). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Chief Justice Cockburn’s last observation, regarding the fact that the statement was 
not made in the presence of the accused, reflected, at least in part, the party witness rule.  
Just as the accused enjoyed a privilege against self-incrimination, there was in England at the 
time of Bedingfield a ban on the accused’s testifying on his own behalf.  The party was 
simply not allowed to testify at all.  Since Bedingfield could not speak, it seemed unfair to 
admit Rudd’s last declaration.  In fact, Cockburn noted in his pamphlet that, “Possibly, when 
the inability of an accused person to give evidence in his own favour shall have been 
removed, a restriction on the admissibility of statements made against him in his absence, 
and which unanswered may operate to his prejudice . . . may be advantageously removed in 
the interest of justice.” A. E. COCKBURN, A LETTER TO JOHN PITT TAYLOR, ESQ. 16 (Vacher & 
Sons) (1879).  This point was noted by an American judge in rejecting Bedingfield. State v. 
Thompson, 34 S.W. 31, 38 (Mo. 1896) (“As the law now permits the accused to testify, the 
reason for the rigid exclusion of evidence like this has been greatly shaken.  Even Lord Chief 
Justice Cockburn, whose ruling in Bedingfield’s Case was at variance with many English 
and American precedents on this question, and has been rejected both by our courts and law 
writers, conceded that if the prisoner could testify the rule should be relaxed.”).   
  This observation by Chief Justice Cockburn raises an interesting historical and 
policy question seemingly ignored by the Court in Crawford and its progeny.  How much of 
the insistence that witnesses be cross examined in court stemmed from the concern that the 
accused could not testify at all?  Once the party-witness rule was changed, it arguably made 
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In contrast, John Pitt Taylor, a contemporary legal treatise writer who 
initiated a spirited discussion of the Bedingfield case in The Times of 
London, argued that Rudd’s statement fell squarely within res gestae.112  
According to Taylor, Rudd’s running from the room was part of the 
action—an inseverable aspect of the crime.  Taylor also rejected the notion 
that the res gestae had to transpire in front of the accused.113 
Lord Chief Justice Cockburn’s explanation, expanded upon in his 
pamphlet defending his Bedingfield decision, is in itself sufficient grounds 
to deem the doctrine unwieldy.  I quote a full paragraph (that is also just 
one sentence) to offer the reader a sense of the density—one might say 
impenetrability—of Cockburn’s description of the doctrine114: 
 Whatever act, or series of acts, constitute, or in point of time 
immediately accompany and terminate in the principal act charged 
as an offence against the accused, from its inception to its 
 
sense to at least revisit the policy calculations where the witness had something to say and 
was truly unavailable. 
 112. J. Pitt-Taylor, Letter to the Editor, The Law of Evidence as Expounded by the Lord 
Chief Justice, TIMES (London), Nov. 17, 1879 (available on Hein Online).  Bedingfield 
presents a window into the culture of evidence scholarship.  The reactions to Bedingfield are 
replete with academic back-biting that makes modern scholarly discourse seem tame if not 
milquetoasty by comparison.  Thayer’s three-part article on the Bedingfield case will quickly 
disabuse modern legal scholars of any misplaced nostalgia for a kinder, gentler age of 
scholarship. 
  The Chief Judge of England responded with acrimony when his opinion in 
Bedingfield was criticized in The Times of London.  The Chief Judge issued pamphlets and 
newspaper editorials mocking Taylor and Simon Greenleaf, who were both evidence treatise 
writers, after Taylor publicly criticized the opinion.  Chief Justice Cockburn expressed 
outrage at the forum and charged anyone who disagreed with him with naiveté and poor 
research skills.  Taylor responded in kind, arguing that the Chief Justice’s attack was 
“neither consistent with your dignity, your generosity, nor your justice.” JOHN PITT TAYLOR, 
A LETTER TO THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND, G.C.B:  IN REPLY TO HIS LORDSHIP’S 
LETTER ON THE BEDINGFIELD CASE 3 (William Maxwell & Son) (1880).  In addition to 
Taylor, the Times of London received Letters signed by:  “Lex,” “A Barrister Present at the 
Trial,” “Long Robe,” and others who just signed with their initials.  Given Chief Justice 
Cockburn’s fury at being challenged, it is not entirely surprising that many of his critics 
preferred to remain anonymous.  For an entertaining discussion of this debate and Chief 
Justice Cockburn’s petulance, see Roderick Munday, The Judge Who Answered His Critics, 
46 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 303 (1987). 
  In writing about the Bedingfield case, Thayer was snide about many fellow legal 
scholars.  For instance, of the treatise writer, Greenleaf, Thayer observes:  “Greenleaf’s 
general conceptions were not original,—they were English.” Thayer (pt. III), supra note 10, 
at 74.  Thayer proceeded to assess the work of this derivative scholar’s treatment of res 
gestae:  “Greenleaf has thus helped to give a vague reach and diffusion to the doctrine.” Id. 
at 76.  Thayer approved of the term “evidentiary facts,” which he denoted as “[o]ne of 
Bentham’s words, which unlike many of those ugly creations, has passed into good legal 
usage.” Id. at 81 n.1.  At another juncture, tracing the history of the phrase res gestae, 
Thayer noted that “[w]e find it first in the mouth of Garrow and Lord Kenyon,—two 
famously ignorant men.” Thayer (pt. II), supra note 10, at 10 n.1.  Aside from the 
vituperative tone the scholarly discussions of the case presented a starkly clinical, hyper-
intellectual approach to an underlying tragedy, a hallmark of legal scholarship today as well. 
 113. PITT TAYLOR, supra note 112, at 16–17. 
 114. The rest of the pamphlet is easy to read and jaunty, if condescending in tone.  
Tellingly, even a stylist like Cockburn could not render the res gestae doctrine 
comprehensible. 
2010] SEX, THREATS, AND ABSENT VICTIMS 131 
consummation or final completion, or its prevention or 
abandonment—whether on the part of the agent or wrong-doer, in 
order to its performance, or on that of the patient or party wronged 
in order to its prevention—and whatever may be said by either of 
the parties during the continuance of the transaction, with reference 
to it—including herein what may be said by the suffering party, 
though in the absence of the accused, during the continuance of the 
action of the latter, actual or constructive—as e.g., in the case of 
flight or applications for assistance—form part of the principal 
transaction and may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae 
or particulars of it; while, on the other hand, statements made by 
the complaining party, after all action on the part of  the wrong-
doer—actual or constructive—has ceased, through the completion 
of the principle act or other determination of it by its prevention, or 
its abandonment by the wrong-doer—such as e.g. statements made 
with a view to the apprehension of the offender—do not form part 
of the res gestae, and should be excluded.115 
One can certainly understand Taylor’s comment that, after perusing the 
Chief Justice’s definition, he found himself “enveloped in a fog.”116 
Bedingfield influenced American law by negative example.  
Bedingfield’s close attention to timing was much criticized on this side of 
the Atlantic.  Wigmore, the father of the excited utterance, pronounced the 
Bedingfield limitation on res gestae erroneous, and predicted that it would 
“almost certainly not be followed in this country.”117  Most American 
jurists applying res gestae found the Bedingfield rule to be “an 
unreasonably strict construction.”118 
In Insurance Co. v. Mosley,119 the Supreme Court applied the concept of 
res gestae to the declarations of the deceased made shortly after he received 
a mortal injury regarding the cause of his injury.120  The Court held that the 
 
 115. COCKBURN, supra note 111, at 19. 
 116. PITT TAYLOR, supra note 112, at 20–21. 
 117. 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW:  INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL JURISDICTIONS OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 1756, at 2266 n.6 (1904); see State v. Murphy, 17 A. 998, 998–99 
(R.I. 1889) (referring to Bedingfield as “much criticised” and “tak[ing] extreme ground”). 
But see People v. Ah Lee, 60 Cal. 85, 87, 92 (1882) (holding that victim’s statement that 
“hallooed murder” after victim was stabbed was not part of the res gestae and commending 
Bedingfield:  “[W]e think that the line which separates statements which are admissible in 
evidence as a part of the res gestae from those which are admissible only as dying 
declarations, is well defined by Mr. Chief Justice Cockburn.”). 
 118. Murray v. Boston & Me. R.R., 54 A. 289, 291 (N.H. 1903).  But, as one might 
expect, there were variations in the jurisprudence and some American courts did follow the 
strictures of Bedingfield, particularly on the west coast. See, e.g., Coryell v. Clifford F. Reid, 
Inc., 4 P.2d 295 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (following Ah Lee, 60 Cal. 85).  After reviewing 
the cases, my view is that the majority rule favored a loosened timing requirement. But see 
generally Fisher, supra note 8 (focusing on the cases that did require precise 
contemporaneousness). 
 119. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 397 (1869).   
 120. Mosley is a civil, not a criminal, case.  Thayer explained that although in criminal 
cases “evidence against an accused person must be given in his presence” that rule “is 
nowhere, in either country, held to cut down the admission of declarations which are a part 
of the res gesta.” Thayer, supra note 1, at 828.  “[N]o distinction between civil cases and 
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declarant’s statement to his wife that he had fallen down the back stairs and 
hit his head was competent evidence in the lawsuit against the insurance 
company.  Justice Noah Haynes Swayne, writing for the majority, had no 
trouble holding that the declarant’s statements as to his then-existing 
physical condition were admissible as verbal acts.  More controversially, he 
held that the declarant’s later statement as to what caused the injury were 
part of the res gestae explaining:  “To bring such declarations within this 
principle, generally, they must be contemporaneous with the main fact to 
which they relate.  But this rule is, by no means, of universal 
application.”121  Insightfully, the Court explained that:  “In the complexity 
of human affairs, what is done and what is said are often so related that 
neither can be detached without leaving the residue fragmentary and 
distorted.”122  Referring to res gestae, the Court observed:  “The tendency 
of recent adjudications is to extend rather than to narrow, the scope of the 
doctrine.”123  With more optimism than was warranted for the benighted res 
gestae doctrine, the Court opined:  “Rightly guarded in its practical 
application, there is no principle in the law of evidence more safe in its 
results.  There is none which rests on a more solid basis of reason and 
authority.”124 
American courts, although they were more flexible than their English 
counterparts, continued to struggle with the definition and application of res 
gestae, and refused to admit mere narratives of past events under the 
doctrine.125  In his article on the Bedingfield case, Thayer acknowledged 
that “difficult questions may arise as to contemporaneousness.  There can 
seldom be a perfect coincidence of time . . . .”126  According to Thayer, 
Rudd’s declaration was made sufficiently close in time to be admissible.127 
 
criminal cases as to the admission of declarations as a part of the res gesta has as yet been 
made out, and it is very late in the day to adventure upon such an enterprise.” Id. at 829. 
 121. Mosley, 75 U.S. at 407. 
 122. Id. at 408. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.  In 1880, the Supreme Court of South Carolina similarly explained the rule with 
an explicit caveat that the timing need not be exactly contemporaneous: 
To make declarations a part of the res gestae, they must be contemporaneous with 
the main fact, not, however, precisely concurrent in point of time.  If they spring 
out of the transaction, elucidate it, and are made at a time so near to it as 
reasonably to preclude the idea of deliberate design, they are then to be regarded as 
contemporaneous. 
State v. Belcher, 13 S.C. 459, 463–64 (1880). 
 125. See Westcott v. Waterloo, C.F. & N. Ry. Co., 155 N.W. 255, 258 (Iowa 1915) (“The 
doctrine has not been as closely applied in this country, and it is not required that the 
declaration be contemporaneous with the act, but all courts hold that it must be spontaneous, 
and not a narrative of past events.  It must appear that the interval of time did not afford an 
opportunity to premeditate and fabricate.”); see, e.g., Herren v. People, 62 P. 833, 834 (Colo. 
1900) (rejecting res gestae where the “purported declarations were neither spontaneous nor 
voluntary.  They were in response to questions asked, and were clearly narrative of a past 
event, in no sense explanatory of the principal fact, or connected with it.”).  
 126. Thayer (pt. III), supra note 10, at 84. 
 127. Id. at 89. 
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Over time, influenced by Thayer and Wigmore, courts did not insist on 
precise contemporaneity.128  The two scholars differed in their explanation 
for the break with Bedingfield.  For Thayer, the closeness in time and 
relatedness of the words to the action sufficiently justified the inclusion of 
the statement as res gestae.129  Wigmore, who was Thayer’s student, 
demanded that the statement be prompted by a startling event.  According 
to Wigmore, the startling nature of the event guaranteed trustworthiness that 
mere timing or spontaneity could not replicate.130  Thus, Thayer is the 
granddaddy of the modern present sense impression—an excited utterance 
sans the excitement (but with closer attention to the timing); Wigmore is the 
champion of the excited utterance (he disdained the present sense 
impression).  A generation later, Professor Edmund Morgan commented 
that insisting on exact contemporaneousness for all such statements was 
impractical, and embraced both exceptions.131 
Modern courts rarely employ the term res gestae;132 it is a relic that 
served as a transitional device in the evolution of various hearsay 
exceptions and in honing the definition of hearsay.  Some types of res 
gestae, such as verbal acts, are not classified as hearsay at all because they 
are not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted.133  Other doctrinal 
descendants of res gestae fall within modern exceptions, including excited 
utterance, present sense impression, then-existing state-of-mind, and 
statements made for medical diagnosis.134  Unquestionably, as a matter of 
hearsay doctrine, courts today would consider Rudd’s statement an excited 
utterance, that is, an out-of-court statement “relating to a startling event or 
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement 
caused by the event or condition.”135  It probably would also have qualified 
as a present sense impression, which is defined as an out-of-court 
declaration “describing or explaining an event or condition made while the 
declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately 
 
 128. See Coffin v. Bradbury, 35 P. 715, 721 (Idaho 1894) (“[T]he decided weight is that 
time is not necessarily a controlling element or principle in the matter of res gestae.”). 
 129. Thayer (pt. III), supra note 10, at 83. 
 130. WIGMORE, supra note 104, § 1756, at 164. 
 131. See Edmund M. Morgan, Res Gestae, 12 WASH. L. REV. 91, 96–98 (1937); Morgan, 
supra note 100, at 236–37.  For an erudite discussion of the scholarly history of res gestae in 
America, see Deparvine v. State, 995 So. 2d 351, 362–63 (Fla. 2008). 
 132. See, e.g., Cassidy v. State, 536 A.2d 666, 670 n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (“‘In 
this case, we will not rely upon the undifferentiated phrase res gestae, because that umbrella 
term covers a wide variety of analytically distinct rationales’.” (quoting Moore v. State, 338 
A.2d 344, 346 n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975))). 
 133. See id. at 671–72 (listing seven different modern manifestations of res gestae 
including the nonhearsay uses of verbal acts, verbal parts of acts, and implied assertions); 
see, e.g., Deparvine, 995 So. 2d at 362 n.7 (including in res gestae “‘part of a relevant 
transaction the offered evidence of which has no hearsay aspect’” (quoting Edmund M. 
Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941–1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 481, 568 (1946))). 
 134. Municipality of Bethel Park v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 636 A.2d 1254, 1257 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (“[R]es gestae is no longer itself a specific hearsay exception.  
Rather, it is a generic term which encompasses four distinct exceptions:  (1) declarations as 
to present bodily conditions; (2) declarations as to present mental states or emotions; (3) 
excited utterances; and (4) present sense impressions.”). 
 135. FED. R. EVID. 803(2); see also 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 97, § 268. 
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thereafter.”136  In both cases, from a hearsay perspective, the availability of 
the declarant to testify is immaterial and the proponent of the evidence need 
not call the declarant to the witness stand.137 
Excited utterances and present sense impressions pose significant 
problems for the modern confrontation doctrine, however, and Bedingfield, 
though it presents no helpful solutions, anticipates those very problems. 
II.  MODERN CONFRONTATION JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS RELATION TO 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTIONS 
A.  The Supreme Court’s New Approach to Confrontation 
In Crawford v. Washington,138 the Supreme Court reshaped our 
understanding of the protections offered by the Sixth Amendment right to 
confront witnesses.139  Crawford held that an out-of-court “testimonial” 
statement may be used against the accused only if the declarant is either (1) 
available for cross-examination, or (2) proved unavailable, and the 
testimonial statement was subject to cross-examination by the accused 
previously.140  Crawford’s focus on “testimonial” statements represented a 
new approach.  The opinion is steeped in history and strives to effectuate 
the original intent of the Sixth Amendment, emulating the common law at 
the time the amendment was originally written.141 
 
 136. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
 137. Federal Rule of Evidence 803 sets forth exceptions to the hearsay rule, including the 
excited utterance exceptions, for which availability of the declarant is immaterial.  Rule 803 
exceptions have been considered either sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible without 
requiring imposition of the time and expense associated with production of a declarant, or of 
a type where cross-examination of the declarant would purportedly provide no additional 
information to the fact finder.  The constitutionality of admitting at least some excited 
utterances and present sense impressions where the declarant is not called to testify has been 
called into question by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 138. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 139. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that, “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 140. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009) (“A witness’s 
testimony against a defendant is thus inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the 
witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”).  The 
practical effect of Crawford was to limit the admissibility of so-called “testimonial” 
statements.  The Court has subsequently made clear that nontestimonial statements present 
only hearsay, and not confrontation, concerns. See infra note 316 and accompanying text. 
 141. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54.  Justice Scalia explained that the Confrontation Clause is 
“most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting 
only those exceptions established at the time of the founding.” Id.  Scalia’s originalist 
approach has been attacked for its lack of wisdom and its method.  In a series of articles, 
Professor Thomas Davies has convincingly argued that Justice Scalia’s historical account is 
flawed and that Crawford’s approach to unsworn hearsay is inconsistent with the basic 
premises that shaped the Framers’ understanding of the confrontation right. See Thomas Y. 
Davies, Not “the Framers’ Design”:  How the Framing-Era Ban against Hearsay Evidence 
Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the Original 
Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 355 (2007) [hereinafter Davies, Not the 
Framers’ Design] (arguing that a testimonial versus nontestimonial distinction does not 
accurately reflect the Founders’ approach to confrontation, and that Justice Scalia’s 
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Crawford explicitly overruled Ohio v. Roberts,142 which admitted out-of-
court statements as long as they bore “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’”143  
Justice Scalia, who authored Crawford and all the recent confrontation 
opinions, rejected the reliability inquiry and derided it as “inherently, and 
therefore permanently, unpredictable.”144  He emphasized that “[w]here 
testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to 
leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of 
evidence, much less to amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’”145  Crawford 
focused on the procedural nature of the confrontation right, explaining:  “To 
be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it 
is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.  It commands, not that 
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner:  
by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”146  Crawford indicated 
only two potential exceptions to its rules limiting the admission of 
testimonial statements against the accused:  dying declarations (which were 
admitted at the time the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was 
written)147 and forfeiture by wrongdoing, whereby the accused forfeits his 
confrontation right by intentionally procuring the witness’s absence.148 
Although everything turns on the definition, Crawford did not fully 
explain what constitutes a “testimonial statement.”149  In delineating which 
 
originalism is a “fundamentally flawed approach to constitutional interpretation in criminal 
procedure issues because originalists fail to grasp—or to admit—the degree to which legal 
doctrine and legal institutions have changed since the framing”); Thomas Y. Davies, 
Selective Originalism:  Sorting Out Which Aspects of Giles’ Forfeitures Exception to 
Confrontation Were or Were Not “Established at the Time of the Founding”, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 605, 610, 663 (2009) (deriding “the purely fictional character of Crawford’s 
purportedly originalist claim regarding the testimonial/nontestimonial hearsay distinction” 
and noting that “during the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth century[,] . . . 
forfeiture by wrongdoing plainly was limited to prior sworn and confronted testimony” and 
Scalia’s forfeiture exception would expand the Framers’ approach); Thomas Y. Davies, 
What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It?  Fictional Originalism in 
Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 107–08, 205 (2005) (arguing that there is 
no historical basis for the restriction of the confrontation right to only “testimonial” hearsay; 
the cross-examination rule derived from the application of Marian statutes was actually a 
legal development that occurred after the framing of the Sixth Amendment). 
 142. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 143. Id. at 66 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972)).  This test was 
satisfied if the out-of-court statement falls within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or 
bears “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 144. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 n.10. 
 145. Id. at 61. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 56 n.6. (“The one deviation we have found involves dying declarations.  The 
existence of that exception as a general rule of criminal hearsay law cannot be disputed.”). 
See generally Aviva Orenstein, Her Last Words:  Dying Declarations and Modern 
Confrontation Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1411. 
 148. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (“For example, the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing 
(which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds.” 
(citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–59 (1878))). 
 149. The Court itself noted that “[w]e leave for another day any effort to spell out a 
comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’” Id. at 68.  It did not need to decide the question 
because Sylvia Crawford’s statements to police at the station were “testimonial” by any 
measure.  Chief Justice William Rehnquist predicted in his concurrence in the judgment that 
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statements are “testimonial” the Court focused primarily on whether the 
declarant anticipated that law enforcement would use the statement to 
prosecute the accused.150  Post-Crawford, amid serious confusion, various 
lower courts struggled with the definition of “testimonial” and focused on 
additional factors such as:  the role of the government in generating the 
evidence; whether the declarant initiated contact with law-enforcement 
authorities; the location and context in which the declarant gave the 
statement to law enforcement agents; and the structure and formality of the 
questioning.151 
Of the many questions Crawford left open in its failure to define the term 
“testimonial,” among the most difficult arose in domestic-violence cases.  
Specifically, lower courts wrestled with the testimonial quality of 911 calls 
and on-site interviews of victims by police.152  In some senses, such 
statements seem testimonial because they report criminal conduct to police, 
and an objective declarant could reasonably expect such statements would 
be available for use at a later trial.  On the other hand, 911 calls and on-the-
scene interviews by police are less formal153 and may be targeted to the 
victim’s safety rather than conducted for the purpose of generating 
evidence, and hence do not seem testimonial.   
 
the immediate effect of Crawford would be immense confusion as to what sorts of 
statements were “testimonial.” Id. at 75–76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) 
(citations omitted).  Many commentators agree. See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic 
Violence Cases after Davis:  Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 759, 760 
(2007) (“Crawford’s failure to define what is testimonial led to two years of judges reading 
tea leaves, and reaching contrary outcomes.”); Jennifer B. Sokoler, Note, Between Substance 
and Procedure:  A Role for States’ Interests in the Scope of the Confrontation Clause, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 161, 173 (2010) (discussing Crawford’s “failure to fully define the contours 
of the concept embedded at the heart of the new Confrontation Clause framework:  
testimonial statements”). 
 150. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52 (reasoning that at their core, testimonial statements 
include “‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as 
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions’” (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 
346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))).  Beyond 
this list of obvious, formal testimonial statements, the court included other “‘statements that 
were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe 
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial’.” Id. at 52 (quoting Brief for 
Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3, 
Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21754961).  Tellingly, the Court did not 
attempt to craft a definition of its own, but quoted from the parties and amici. See id. 
 151. See, e.g., Gary M. Bishop, Testimonial Statements, Excited Utterances and the 
Confrontation Clause:  Formulating A Precise Rule After Crawford and Davis, 54 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 559 (2006); Josephine Ross, Crawford’s Short-Lived Revolution:  How Davis v. 
Washington Reins In Crawford’s Reach, 83 N.D. L. REV. 387 (2007). 
 152. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 817 (2006) (explaining its mission “to 
determine when statements made to law enforcement personnel during a 911 call or at a 
crime scene are ‘testimonial’ and thus subject to the requirements of the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause”). 
 153. Ultimately, the Court did not rely on formality as a touchstone for determining 
whether a statement is testimonial. See id. at 826.  Justice Thomas dissented in Davis, 
advocating a test that looked for “formalized dialogue . . . statements sufficiently formal to 
resemble the Marian examinations.” Id. at 840 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part). 
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The Court addressed the testimonial nature of statements made by 
domestic violence victims to police in Davis v. Washington154 and its 
companion case, Hammon v. Indiana.155  Davis involved a 911 emergency 
call placed by a victim during a violent incident with her former boyfriend.  
During the call, the victim told the 911 operator that Davis had just run out 
the door after hitting her.  The 911 operator asked numerous questions 
including Davis’s full name, birthday, purpose for visiting the victim’s 
residence, and the context of the assault.156  Upon arrival, the police 
observed the victim’s “‘shaken state,’” the “‘fresh injuries on her forearm 
and her face’,” and her “‘frantic efforts to gather her belongings and her 
children so that they could leave the residence.’”157  Because the victim did 
not appear at Davis’s trial despite the prosecution’s attempt to secure her in-
court testimony, the State’s only live, in-court witnesses were the two 
responding officers, neither of whom had witnessed the incident.158  Over 
Davis’s objections, the trial court admitted the recording of the victim’s 911 
call and convicted Davis of a felony violation of a domestic no-contact 
order.159 
Similarly, Hammon, the companion case, involved statements made to 
law enforcement personnel who responded to a reported domestic 
disturbance.  When the officers arrived, they found the victim, Amy 
Hammon, on the porch appearing “‘somewhat frightened,’” although she 
told them “‘nothing was the matter.’”160  She allowed the police to enter, 
and they found evidence of a struggle in the living room.  The accused was 
in the kitchen.161  The officers separated the victim and the accused and 
again asked the victim what had occurred.162  Though the accused 
attempted to interrupt, Ms. Hammon eventually described the violent 
incident, and completed and signed a battery affidavit.163  Amy Hammon 
did not appear at trial and the State, over the accused’s objections, called 
the officer who questioned her to describe what she told him.164 
Denying any attempt to “produce an exhaustive classification of all 
conceivable statements,”165 the Court strove to differentiate testimonial 
from nontestimonial statements in the domestic violence context, using the 
 
 154. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 155. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).  In Davis and Hammon, the Court acknowledged that it had to 
refine its definition of “testimonial statements” because the “character of the statements in 
the present cases is not as clear, and these cases require us to determine more precisely 
which police interrogations produce testimony.” Id. at 822. 
 156. Id. at 818. 
 157. Id. (quoting State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 847 (Wash. 2005) (en banc), aff’d, 547 
U.S. 813 (2006)). 
 158. Id. at 818–19. 
 159. Id. at 819. 
 160. Id. (quoting Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 446–47 (Ind. 2005), rev’d sub nom. 
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006)). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 820. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 822. 
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Davis and Hammon cases to illustrate the distinction.  According to the 
Court, nontestimonial statements are “made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency.”166  Statements are testimonial, however, “when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, 
and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove 
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”167 
Applying this standard to Davis and Hammon, the Court concluded that 
“the initial interrogation conducted in connection with a 911 call, is 
ordinarily not designed primarily to ‘establis[h] or prov[e]’ some past fact, 
but to describe current circumstances requiring police assistance.”168  In 
addition, “any reasonable listener” would recognize that the declarant in 
Davis (as opposed to Sylvia Crawford, who gave her statement while safely 
ensconced in a police station) “was facing an ongoing emergency.”169  The 
victim’s interrogation in Davis elicited statements that were “necessary to 
be able to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to learn . . . 
what had happened in the past.”170  The Court concluded that the victim 
was “speaking about events as they were actually happening, rather than 
‘describ[ing] past events.’”171  The Court conceded that “one might call 911 
to provide a narrative report of a crime absent any imminent danger,” but 
decided that the victim in Davis (as opposed to Amy Hammon) was plainly 
making “a call for help against a bona fide physical threat.”172  The 
circumstances of the interrogation in Davis “objectively indicate its primary 
purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”173  
Therefore, the Court held that the victim’s initial statements on the 911 call 
in Davis were nontestimonial.174 
Hammon was dispatched easily because, according to the Court, there 
was “no emergency in progress.”175  The Court explained that the officer 
questioning Amy Hammon “was not seeking to determine (as in Davis) 
‘what is happening,’ but rather ‘what happened.’”176  The Court 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 827. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 828. 
 174. Id. at 829.  Once the declarant started answering specific questions posed by the 
dispatcher regarding non-emergency matters, however, that part of the interview became a 
testimonial statement. Id. at 828–29.  The 911 call involved spontaneous statements by the 
declarant as well as answers to questions regarding the alleged perpetrator’s date of birth, 
preceded by the exhortation from the 911 operator to “‘[s]top talking and answer my 
questions.’” Id. at 818 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 42, Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 
(2006) (No. 05-5224), 2005 WL 3598182). 
 175. Id. at 829. 
 176. Id. at 830.  As the Court explained:  “Amy’s narrative of past events was delivered at 
some remove in time from the danger she described.  And after Amy answered the officer’s 
questions, he had her execute an affidavit, in order, he testified, ‘[t]o establish events that 
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acknowledged that exigencies surrounding a domestic violence call “may 
often mean that ‘initial inquiries’ produce nontestimonial statements.”177  
But it distinguished Hammon, where the declarant’s statements “were 
neither a cry for help nor the provision of information enabling officers 
immediately to end a threatening situation.”178 
Because the focus of Crawford had been on the original intent of the 
drafters of the Sixth Amendment, and Justice Scalia wrote extensively 
about the common-law right to confront accusers, the accused in Davis 
attempted to apply old English cases.  The Court specifically distinguished 
King v. Brasier,179 an English case from 1779, that excluded the out-of-
court statement of a young rape victim, who “‘immediately on her coming 
home, told all the circumstances of the injury’ to her mother.”180  The Court 
explained that Brasier “would be helpful to Davis” in excluding the out-of 
court-statement if Brasier had concerned “the girl’s screams for aid as she 
was being chased by her assailant.  But by the time the victim got home, her 
story was an account of past events.”181 
The Court also noted the level of formality and contrasted the calm, 
formal police station statement of Crawford with the frantic impromptu 
nature of the 911 call in Davis.182  However, the mere fact that the victim’s 
statements were made “at an alleged crime scene and were ‘initial inquiries’ 
is immaterial.”183  Instead, the court focused on the intention of the victim 
and police, as well as the timing of the incident, to determine whether the 
statement was an account of past criminality or a cry for immediate police 
protection. 
Justice Thomas, in dissent, argued that the line the majority tried to draw 
between emergencies and reports of past events, relying on primary 
motives, is blurry and impossible to apply.184  He made a persuasive case 
that Amy Hammon was as much in danger at the moment she made her 
declaration as was the victim in Davis.185  Although Davis certainly 
considered the declarant’s point of view, noting that the victim was 
 
have occurred previously.’” Id. at 832 (quoting Brief of Petitioner Herman Hammon at 36, 
Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (No. 05-5705), 2005 WL 3597706). 
 177. Id. (quoting Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 453, 457 (Ind. 2005), rev’d sub nom. 
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006)). 
 178. Id. 
 179. 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (L.R.C.C.R.); 1 Leach 199 (1779).  For an excellent discussion of 
the Court’s misuse of this case, see Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept 
and Exceptions to Confrontation:  “A Little Child Shall Lead Them”, 82 IND. L.J. 917, 923–
33 (2007). 
 180. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828 (quoting Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. at 202; 1 Leach at 200). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 827 (“[T]he difference in the level of formality between the two interviews [in 
Davis and Crawford] is striking.”). 
 183. Id. at 832 (quoting Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 453, 457 (Ind. 2005), rev’d 
sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006)). 
 184. Id. at 840–42 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 185. Id. at 841 n.6 (noting that some of the factors on which the Court distinguishes 
Davis, such as the fact that Hammon was separated from her attacker and that the events in 
Hammon were already over, apply equally to Davis). 
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“seeking aid, not telling a story about the past,”186 the case is confusing 
because it seems to shift focus from the expectations of the declarant, which 
was the key factor in Crawford to, at least in part, the intent of the 
investigator.187  Many scholars agree that Davis is unsound and 
unworkable.188 
Post-Davis, lower courts scrambled to apply the murky standards to the 
myriad of domestic violence cases on their dockets.  Courts and 
commentators also latched onto the issue of forfeiture, which was left open 
in Crawford,189 and which Davis hinted might address some of the 
prosecutorial concerns about intimidation of victims.  Davis acknowledged 
that domestic violence is a “type of crime [that] is notoriously susceptible to 
intimidation or coercion of the victim to ensure that she does not testify at 
trial.”190  The Court noted that in cases where the accused makes the 
declarant unavailable through intimidation or other means, forfeiture is an 
option.191 
Two years after Davis, in Giles v. California,192 the Court addressed 
forfeiture, a longstanding equitable principle in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence.193  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority for the third time 
in as many cases, addressed the circumstances by which an accused can 
forfeit the right to confrontation.  In Giles the accused was charged with 
murdering his girlfriend, Brenda Avie.  Weeks before her death, Avie made 
tearful statements to police responding to a domestic violence report that 
Giles had choked her, punched her in the face and head, and threatened to 
 
 186. Id. at 831. 
 187. Without so acknowledging, the Court switched its focus from the declarant to the 
government agent.  In Crawford, the focus was on what Sylvia Crawford believed would 
happen with her statement.  In Davis and Hammon, the purpose of the police investigator 
was equally if not more important than the intent of the declarant in ascertaining the 
testimonial quality of the statement. See Lininger, supra note 108, at 280; Ellen Liang Yee, 
Confronting the “Ongoing Emergency”:  A Pragmatic Approach to Hearsay Evidence in the 
Context of the Sixth Amendment, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 729, 766 (2008) (“Notwithstanding 
the Court’s claim that the inquiry is focused on ‘the declarant’s statements, not the 
interrogator’s questions,’ the opinion also repeatedly referred to whether the questioner’s 
conduct can generate or produce testimonial statements.” (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 
n.1)). 
 188. See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 108, at 274 (“[T]he Davis ruling accomplished a rare 
feat:  it caused consternation among both prosecutors and defense attorneys.  Commentators 
on all sides expressed their disappointment that the Court had not devised a comprehensive, 
easily administrable set of rules for the confrontation of accusers.”); Raeder, supra note 149, 
at 762 (“Davis’ bright line is illusory and hard to apply.”); Yee, supra note 187, at 733 (“The 
Court’s approach provides insufficient guidance to assist lower courts in determining which 
facts indicate the presence of an ‘ongoing emergency,’ particularly in the context of 
domestic violence.” (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822)). 
 189. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). 
 190. Davis, 547 U.S. at 832–33.  The Court added:  “We take no position on the standards 
necessary to demonstrate such forfeiture.” Id. at 833. 
 191. Id. at 833; see Orenstein, supra note 147, at 1435. 
 192. 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008). 
 193. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 148–50 (1878) (admitting former 
testimony of wife where accused had kept his wife away from home so that she could not be 
subpoenaed to testify). 
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kill her with a knife.194  Three weeks later, Giles did kill Avie, claiming that 
he acted in self-defense.195  At his murder trial, Giles supported his self-
defense claim by describing Avie “as jealous, vindictive, aggressive, and 
violent.”196  To rebut Giles’s claim of self-defense and impeach his 
testimony, the State introduced into evidence Avie’s uncross-examined 
statements to police weeks before the killing.197 
Although the Justices acted on the assumption that the victim’s 
statements were testimonial,198 the Court addressed whether by merely 
killing the victim (something the accused acknowledged that he did, 
allegedly in self-defense) the accused forfeited his right to confront her 
prior statements.  Reviewing the old common-law cases, the Court ruled 
that to fall within the forfeiture doctrine, the accused must intend to procure 
the declarant’s absence and prevent the witness from testifying.199  Giles 
held that not every homicide case automatically opens the door to admitting 
the victim’s former testimonial statements.200  To do so would ignore the 
historic intent requirement and deprive the accused of his confrontation 
rights.201  The dissent questioned Giles’s focus on the accused’s subjective 
intent to make the declarant unavailable and instead advocated an objective 
test of whether a reasonable accused would recognize that his actions would 
render the witness unavailable, arguing that such an objective test would be 
consonant with the equitable notion of forfeiture.202  The dissent questioned 
Justice Scalia’s historical account of forfeiture and disdained his exercise of 
“trying to guess the state of mind of 18th Century lawyers,” particularly 
when applied to a cause of action—domestic battery—that was unheard of 
two hundred years ago.203 
 
 194. Such statements of fear by women anticipating their demise by the violent hands of a 
specific individual who intends to do the declarant harm do not qualify as dying 
declarations—it is not even a close question.  Even where, as in Giles, a declaration 
anticipates murder days or weeks before a homicide, it fails the strictures of the dying 
declaration exception, because death is neither certain nor imminent. See Orenstein, supra 
note 147, at 1420–23. 
 195. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2681.  The victim had no weapon, suffered some defensive 
wounds, and was shot while lying on the ground. Id. 
 196. Id. at 2695 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 2682 (majority opinion).  Actually, some of the Justices expressed doubts 
about the testimonial nature of Avie’s prior statement, which was made at a crime scene, but 
for the sake of argument, all nine Justices assumed without deciding that the statement was 
testimonial because the issue had been conceded below. Id. 
 199. Id. at 2683–84. 
 200. See id. at 2688. 
 201. Another less persuasive argument concerned the role of the judge in determining a 
preliminary fact that was also an ultimate fact for the jury.  “The notion that judges may strip 
the defendant of a right that the Constitution deems essential to a fair trial, on the basis of a 
prior judicial assessment that the defendant is guilty as charged, does not sit well with the 
right to trial by jury.” Id. at 2686.  Here the Court referred to the fact that in order to trigger a 
finding of forfeiture, the judge must make a preliminary finding by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the accused killed the victim and hence forfeited his confrontation right. Id. at 
2691–92.  This would pose problems in cases where the accused denied killing the victim. 
 202. Id. at 2703–04 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 203. Id. at 2707. 
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B.  Modern Approaches to Defining and Prosecuting Domestic Violence 
Domestic violence is defined as a “pattern of attempts to exercise 
coercive control over an intimate partner.”204  It often involves physical 
violence, sexual coercion, emotional abuse, and economic control.205  I am 
concerned here with the type of domestic violence that involves criminal 
conduct, such as rape, assault, or murder.206  One-quarter of all adult 
American women will experience at least one physical assault by a 
partner.207  Although there are certainly situations where men are victims, 
the focus here is on violence against women; domestic violence against men 
is rarer, and the violence is much less likely to cause serious injury or 
fear.208 
Intimate partner violence has always existed in western culture, but 
historically remained officially unnoticed and outside the purview of public 
concern.209  Changes in nineteenth century Anglo-American family law 
that, for the first time, permitted divorce but required proof of good cause, 
opened a window to the private, often hidden, stories of intra-family 
brutality.210  Divorce courts contributed to fuller awareness and open 
discussion of domestic violence, and a social movement against wife 
 
 204. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 327 (2d ed. 2009). 
 205. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW:  THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 7 (2d ed. 2008) (“Although domestic violence is often thought of as primarily 
physical . . . . abusers commonly combine physical abuse with psychological, financial, or 
other forms of abuse, such as isolation.”); see PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L 
INST. OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE:  
FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 5 (2000), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf (discussing “the myriad behaviors that 
persons may use to control, intimidate, and otherwise dominate another person in the context 
of an intimate relationship,” including “verbal abuse, imprisonment, humiliation, stalking, 
and denial of access to financial resources, shelter, or services”). 
 206. Other aspects such as emotional abuse and psychological coercion are legitimate 
societal concerns, but are more difficult to address through law. 
 207. NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS 1 (2007), 
available at http://www.ncadv.org/files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet(National).pdf; see also 
TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 205, at iii (“Nearly 25 percent of surveyed women and 7.6 
percent of surveyed men said they were raped and/or physically assaulted by a current or 
former spouse, cohabiting partner, or date at some time in their lifetime . . . .”). 
 208. See LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN:  A 
SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE 9 (2008) 
(distinguishing between “situational couple violence,” where both intimate partners 
occasionally engage in hitting, slapping, and throwing things, and “intimate terrorism” where 
the perpetrator tends to be a male who controls and coerces the female inducing fear and 
causing serious injury); TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 205, at 17 (“[W]omen were 
significantly more likely than men to report being victimized by an intimate partner . . . . 
[D]ifferences between women’s and men’s rates of physical assault by an intimate partner 
become greater as the seriousness of the assault increases. . . . [Women] were 7 to 14 times 
more likely to report that an intimate partner beat them up, choked or tried to drown them, or 
threatened them with a gun or knife.”). 
 209. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 13–20 
(2000) (offering historical perspectives from Roman times to the present). 
 210. LISA SURRIDGE, BLEAK HOUSES:  MARITAL VIOLENCE IN VICTORIAN FICTION 146 
(2005) (“[D]ivorce court made public acts of ‘private’ cruelty covering the gamut from 
name-calling to violence, imprisonment, rude treatment in front of servants or children, and 
inappropriate treatment of the wife as mistress of the house.”). 
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beating developed that is traceable in the politics and literature of the 
nineteenth century.  Generally, domestic violence was understood primarily 
as a social problem of the lower classes—concerning the likes of Bill 
Sikes211 and Henry Bedingfield—although it certainly can be documented 
in all ethnicities, races,212 and social strata.213 
What society used to minimize as family discord, treated merely as a 
private matter to be dictated by the head of household—who up until 
modern times could legitimately threaten and use violence against his 
wife—now denominates as violence.214  As attitudes towards domestic 
violence changed, the phenomenon of intimate partner abuse became not 
just a social problem, but also a crime.  Part of the feminist agenda in the 
1970s was to take such violence seriously.215  Because of increased 
awareness of the harm caused by domestic violence, lawsuits by citizens 
against police departments for failure to protect them from such violence,216 
and changing social attitudes towards gender roles and the relationship 
between the sexes, domestic violence is now studied by many disciplines 
 
 211. Bill Sikes is the villain in Charles Dickens’s Oliver Twist, who beats and finally kills 
the good-hearted prostitute, Nancy. 
 212. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”:  Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2138–39 (1996) (documenting disproportionate judicial interest in wife 
beating among African Americans and the poor and noting that “[a]s wife beating emerged 
as a ‘law and order’ issue, class- and race-based discourses about marital violence became 
even more pronounced”). 
 213. Domestic violence interacts with culture, race, immigration status, and religion, but 
occurs in diverse families. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 205, at 97–127.  It unquestionably 
exists among the privileged, who may experience more shame as victims and who despair of 
getting help because their batterers may wield power and influence in the community. Id. at 
145–46.  Recent scholarship has shown that even Victorian literature about good middle 
class families also intimated, if not fully described, tales of domestic violence. See, e.g., 
KATE LAWSON & LYNN SHAKINOVSKY, THE MARKED BODY:  DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN MID-
NINETEENTH-CENTURY LITERATURE (2002) (discussing domestic violence in Victorian 
literature). 
 214. See Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State:  The Struggle for the Future of 
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1661 (“At the time of this country’s 
founding, wife-beating was approved as integrally connected to a system in which wives 
ceased to exist as independent legal entities upon marriage.  Because husbands could be held 
responsible for their wives’ conduct, it was believed that they had the right to control their 
wives’ behavior, through physical violence if necessary.” (citations omitted)); Siegel, supra 
note 212, at 2138–41 (discussing the Anglo-American common law of chastisement, and 
noting that when wife beating became illegal, the common law erected various immunities 
and doctrines of privacy to insulate the status quo and limit women’s ability to challenge 
their batterers with criminal or tort law). 
 215. See generally SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE:  THE VISIONS AND 
STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT (1982); SCHNEIDER, supra note 209. 
 216. See, e.g., Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1524–27 (D. Conn. 
1984) (holding for the plaintiff based on police failure to respond to domestic violence where 
the victim had a protective order and for failure to intervene while witnessing the husband’s 
extreme violence against his wife).  This case is credited with changing municipal policies 
about domestic violence. See, e.g., Sara R. Benson, Failure to Arrest:  A Pilot Study of 
Police Response to Domestic Violence in Rural Illinois, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & 
L. 685, 690–91 (2009) (citing Thurman, and the $2.9 million in damages awarded to the 
plaintiff therein, as one of a “few widely publicized court cases holding police or police 
departments liable for a failure to protect domestic violence victims [that] motivated some 
states to enact mandatory arrest laws”). 
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(criminology, psychology, sociology, gender studies, and law) and is treated 
much more seriously by the legal system and by society as a whole. 
Nevertheless, domestic violence prosecutions are notoriously difficult to 
win.  Part of the problem may be residual patriarchal social attitudes about 
male prerogative, women’s roles, or family privacy.  However, another 
aspect of the difficulty in such prosecutions is that victims of intimate 
violence often do not testify.217  They regularly recant, refuse to testify, or 
simply fail to appear.218  The reasons for this high rate are varied and 
complicated.  A victim of intimate partner violence may still love the 
perpetrator and may not want to send him to jail.219  Alternatively, the 
victim may feel embarrassed and humiliated and be unwilling to testify 
about the abuse.  The victim may also decline to testify because she is 
afraid that she might lose her children220 or because the batterer is her only 
source of housing or income.221  Women of color may be suspicious of the 
justice system and be unwilling to participate in what they perceive as a 
racist system of prosecution and punishment.222  Finally, and most 
 
 217. Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too:  Crawford’s Impact on 
Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 328 (2005) (“It became 
obvious relatively quickly in the fight against domestic violence that the major impediment 
to obtaining convictions was that the majority of battered women did not want to testify.  
Even when they appeared at trial, they often recanted their accusations and generally were 
bad witnesses, resulting in relatively few convictions.” (citation omitted)). 
 218. People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 576 (Cal. 2004) (quoting expert testimony that 80–
85% of battered women “‘actually recant at some point in the process’”). 
 219. Raeder, supra note 149, at 760. 
 220. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 209, at 168 (“Custody has always been an important 
issue for battered women because, above all, they fear losing their children to the batterer.”).  
This is not an unfounded fear. See Raeder, supra note 217, at 364 (noting that a victim may 
rightfully “worry that her batterer’s prosecution will result in her children being placed in 
foster care or in her facing charges of child endangerment”); Sarah Childress, Fighting Over 
the Kids:  Battered Spouses Take Aim at a Controversial Custody Strategy, NEWSWEEK, 
Sept. 25, 2006, at 35.  It is common for abusive men to threaten a victim’s children or to 
scare the victim into believing that she will lose custody of her children if she leaves him.  
As to the latter threat, although many states have presumptions against awarding custody to 
batterers or use domestic violence as a negative factor in awarding custody, wife-battering 
fathers prevailed in 40% of contested cases. SCHNEIDER, supra note 209, at 169 (quoting 
Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:  Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 44–45 (1991)).  Women who leave battering relationships are often 
financially disadvantaged and sometimes experience psychological or addiction problems.  
They can appear unbalanced and unprepared to care for their children. See generally Naomi 
R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women:  The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child 
Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041 (1991); Mahoney, supra. 
 221. See G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided:  Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, 
and the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 307 
(2005) (“If we listen to women survivors, we learn that they stay for myriad reasons—fear of 
reprisal, fear of losing their children, economic concerns, emotional ties to the batterer or his 
family, lack of social or familial support, and lack of a place to go.” (citations omitted)). 
 222. Phyliss Craig-Taylor, Lifting the Veil:  The Intersectionality of Ethics, Culture, and 
Gender Bias in Domestic Violence Cases, 32 RUTGERS L. REC. 31, 48–49 (2008). But see 
Sack, supra note 214, at 1679 n.108 (“Although the reluctance of women of color to call 
police is often asserted, actual studies of victim reporting show that African American 
women call police in domestic violence situations at a rate higher than white women.” 
(citing Joan Zorza, Mandatory Arrest, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1023, 
1027 (David Levinson ed., 2002))). 
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importantly, the victim may still fear the accused and distrust the legal 
system’s ability to protect her from his wrath.  Because much violence is 
motivated by a desire to control, domestic violence victims confront an 
increased risk when they try to leave the abuser; in fact, the most dangerous 
time for a woman and the highest risk for murder is when she attempts to 
leave or shortly after.223 
Before Crawford, many jurisdictions, facing the reality that many victims 
do not testify, followed “no-drop” policies in which they would prosecute 
“victimless”—otherwise known as “evidence-based”—cases even if the 
victim did not testify.224  Such prosecution policy depended heavily upon 
the admissibility of the victim’s out-of-court statements to police and 911 
operators.225  Under the old Roberts regime,226 it was relatively easy to 
admit such statements, even if the victim did not testify and was therefore 
not subject to cross-examination concerning her statement. 
Even before Crawford changed the legal landscape, scholars and activists 
debated the wisdom of such “no-drop” policies.  Are such prosecutions 
respectful of the woman’s interest, pursuing the violent offender and 
preserving the victim’s voice by admitting her prior statements?  
Conversely, are prosecutions without the victim’s cooperation subversive of 
her choices and disrespectful of her assessment of risk, given the increased 
danger women face when they try to leave?  The rich literature on the “no-
drop” prosecution policy touches upon many conflicting values.  Many 
favor no-drop policies, arguing that mandating such prosecutions sends a 
message that such violent behavior toward intimates is intolerable, and that 
the perpetrator has committed a crime against the state.227  The state does 
not drop other types of cases merely because the victim would prefer not to 
participate, and it is arguably sexist and patronizing to treat victims of 
 
 223. See ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 204, at 328 (citing CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & 
SARAH WELCHANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PUBL’N NO. NCJ 178247, INTIMATE 
PARTNER VIOLENCE 5 (2000), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv.pdf 
(“[D]ivorced or separated persons were subjected to the highest rates of intimate partner 
victimization.”)); GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 208, at 76 (“Substantial data show that 
separation from the batterer is the time of greatest risk of serious violence and homicide for 
battered women and for their children.” (citations omitted)); Carol E. Jordan, Intimate 
Partner Violence and the Justice System:  An Examination of the Interface, 19 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1412, 1413–14 (2004). 
 224. See Sack, supra note 214, at 1673–74 (“No-drop policies, as well as other 
innovations in domestic violence prosecution, have increased the prosecution rate of these 
cases, and some studies show that they have lowered recidivism.” (citations omitted)). But 
see generally Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1171, 1182–1200 (2002) (pre-Crawford article questioning the fairness and 
constitutionality of prosecutions based on 911 calls).  This is what Professor Myrna Raeder 
has aptly termed the “witness-lite/hearsay-heavy approach.” Raeder, supra note 217, at 329. 
 225. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose:  Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1903 (1996) (advocating use of 911 tapes 
to prove battery where the victim will not testify). 
 226. See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text. 
 227. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 205, at 328; Hanna, supra note 225, at 1884 (“If we 
reject mandated participation because it would be ‘revictimizing,’ we neither account for the 
women’s strength and resilience nor acknowledge the political and social context in which 
battering occurs.” (citations omitted)). 
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domestic violence differently from victims of other crimes.228  By adopting 
a no-drop policy and taking the decision out of the victim’s hands, the 
government can limit abusers’ attempts to bully women into dropping 
charges.229  Leaving the victim with the choice whether to prosecute the 
case could endanger the victim further and perpetuate the power dynamic 
between the abuser and the victim.230 
However, strong counterarguments disfavor mandatory prosecution.231  
Prosecutors sometimes use heavy-handed tactics to assure the victim’s 
testimony at trial.232  When women suffer violence from intimates, they 
often also suffer loss of control over their movements and choices.  Some 
argue that it is intrusive, disempowering,233 and even dangerous234 to use 
victims’ statements when they have chosen not to testify.  The patronizing 
implication is that women who choose not to testify are so traumatized or 
 
 228. Hanna, supra note 225, at 1891. 
 229. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 205, at 328 (quoting police officers that the solution to 
the problem of escalating violence post-arrest was “to take the responsibility out of the hands 
of the victim and place it with the State where it belongs” (quoting Casey G. Gwinn & Anne 
O’Dell, Stopping the Violence:  The Role of the Police Officer and the Prosecutor, 20 W. ST. 
U. L. REV. 297, 310 (1993))); Lininger, supra note 108, at 294 (explaining the view that 
“vacillating accusers are not exercising moral autonomy, but rather are submitting to a 
pattern of abuse and intimidation that has undermined their self-determination; according to 
this view, a no-drop policy is necessary to vindicate the accuser’s autonomy” (citation 
omitted)). 
 230. Hanna, supra note 225, at 1891 (“When a batterer and his defense attorney know 
that a victim’s failure to cooperate may result in case dismissal, they control the judicial 
process.”). 
 231. For views criticizing no-drop policies, see Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism:  
An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 45 (2009) (“[D]omestic violence law and policy should respect the 
rights of individual women to choose whether and how to use the criminal and civil legal 
systems.”); id. at 4 (“Making safety the primary goal of legal interventions is intuitively 
appealing and explains policies like mandatory arrest.  But th[is] goal[] of advocates, 
policymakers, and system actors might differ from those of women who have been 
battered.”); Linda G. Mills, Intuition and Insight:  A New Job Description for the Battered 
Woman’s Prosecutor and Other More Modest Proposals, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 183, 191 
(1997) (criticizing mandatory prosecutions because they may “align the battered woman 
with her batterer, to protect him, and to further entrench her in the abusive relationship”). 
 232. See Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (discussing pressure 
put on victim to testify or face false reporting and observing that “[g]iven the psychological 
complexities of domestic violence cases, it is not at all clear to us that such an approach in 
trying to ‘encourage’ a victim to testify is desirable”); Raeder, supra note 217, at 328–29 
(noting that women who refuse to testify have faced threats of imprisonment and criminal 
charges for child endangerment; some women have been jailed as material witnesses). 
 233. See, e.g., GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 208, at 75 (“[T]he victim is swept into a 
process over which she has little control.  Her own wishes and needs become largely 
irrelevant to that process, even when she fears that prosecution will provoke the batterer into 
retaliatory abuse against her, when she needs her partner’s economic support to keep her 
family afloat, or when she fears that her partner will be deported as a result of the 
prosecution.”). 
 234. See Raeder, supra note 217, at 329 (“[E]mpirical evidence indicated that some 
classes of women were put at greater risk by aggressive prosecution, particularly in 
misdemeanor cases where defendants were released pretrial, or received probation or short 
sentences.” (citations omitted)). 
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weak that they are incapable of making rational choices.235  Such 
mandatory prosecution deprives women of agency and replicates the loss of 
power and emotional abuse they experience in their intimate relationship.236  
No-drop policies can create safety concerns whereby women who do not 
wish to press charges may decline to call police for assistance during an 
attack.237  In fact, some feminists have even hailed Davis because it 
represented an end to the disrespect of the victims represented by no-drop 
prosecutions.238 
C.  The Practical Effect of Crawford and Its Progeny on Domestic Violence 
Prosecution 
The no-drop strategy, dependent as it is on out-of-court statements by the 
absent victim, is significantly harder to effectuate post-Crawford and 
Davis.239  If the court deems the statement testimonial, then the woman 
must appear and be subject to cross-examination; if she does not appear, 
and the case does not involve forfeiture or dying declarations, then the 
prosecutor has no case. 
The Court in Davis seemed fully aware of the practical effect the ruling 
would have on the prosecution of domestic violence cases.240  Whereas 
 
 235. See Miccio, supra note 221, at 241–42 (“A dominant and troubling theme that has 
emerged within the Protagonist bloc is that such practices are necessary because battered 
women are incapable of making a ‘rational’ choice while being traumatized by the violence.  
Mandatory practices then serve as a necessary shield—not just from the violence of 
individual males, but from what is perceived as survivor powerlessness.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 236. Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly:  Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State 
Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 595 (1999) (“[A] dynamic between the state and the 
battered woman emerges that distinctly mimics the violent dynamic in the battering 
relationship.”). 
 237. See GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 208, at 76 (“[B]y coercing victims’ 
participation in the prosecution, the government may teach them to distrust the criminal 
justice system in general.  This experience may well make them far less likely to contact 
police or prosecutors in the future, which in turn may leave them more trapped than ever in 
their violent homes.”); cf. Mills, supra note 236, at 595 (“[M]andatory interventions deny the 
battered woman an important opportunity to partner with the state to help ensure her future 
safety.”). 
 238. See generally Kimberly D. Bailey, The Aftermath of Crawford and Davis:  
Deconstructing the Sound of Silence, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1. 
 239.  
  In a survey of over 60 prosecutors’ offices in California, Oregon, and 
Washington, 63 percent of respondents reported the Crawford decision has 
significantly impeded prosecutions of domestic violence.  Seventy-six percent 
indicated that after Crawford, their offices are more likely to drop domestic 
violence charges when the victims recant or refuse to cooperate.  Alarmingly, 65 
percent of respondents reported that victims of domestic violence are less safe in 
their jurisdictions than during the era preceding the Crawford decision. 
Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers after Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 750 (2005) 
(citations omitted); see Lininger, supra note 108, at 281 (“The Supreme Court’s recent 
interpretations of the Confrontation Clause have hindered many categories of prosecutions, 
but none more significantly than prosecutions of domestic violence.” (citation omitted)). 
 240. I do not discuss the most recent confrontation case, again authored by Justice Scalia, 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009), which deals with the right to 
confront forensic experts.  It differs in tone and subject from the triumvirate of Crawford, 
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issues of gender constituted part of the subtext in Crawford,241 they are, by 
necessity, unmistakably and frankly addressed in Davis.  Similarly, in 
Giles, the issue of forfeiture was closely linked to the domestic violence 
context in which the case arose.242  Justice Scalia was particularly adamant 
that public policy concerning domestic violence could not sway the 
constitutional command.243  He positively disdained the suggestion, which 
he attributed to the dissent, that “a forfeiture rule which ignores Crawford 
would be particularly helpful to women in abusive relationships—or at least 
particularly helpful in punishing their abusers.”244  Justice Scalia decried 
the notion that domestic violence cases be treated differently: 
In any event, we are puzzled by the dissent’s decision to devote its 
peroration to domestic abuse cases.  Is the suggestion that we should have 
one Confrontation Clause (the one the Framers adopted and Crawford 
described) for all other crimes, but a special, improvised, Confrontation 
Clause for those crimes that are frequently directed against women?245 
This acknowledgement of the new jurisprudence’s effect on domestic 
violence cases and the Court’s determination not to modify the 
confrontation right to accommodate the special needs and circumstances of 
domestic violence victims translates into a new legal landscape where the 
crucial question is whether the victim’s statements can be categorized as 
testimonial. 
III.  BEDINGFIELD’S APPLICABILITY TO CONFRONTATION QUESTIONS 
POSED BY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 
A.  The Parallels Between Bedingfield’s Res Gestae Analysis and 
Crawford’s Definition of “Testimonial Statements” 
Davis’s intellectual enterprise in figuring out which victims’ statements 
are testimonial is eerily similar in tone and content to Bedingfield’s debate 
concerning res gestae.246  In revisiting and expanding upon Crawford’s 
definition of testimonial statements, Davis distinguished those made “facing 
an ongoing emergency” from those generated “after the events . . . had 
occurred.”247  Davis contrasts cases where the declarant “was speaking 
about events as they were actually happening,” with statements that are 
 
Davis, and Giles, though its focus on testimonial statements and avowed disinterest in the 
practical effects on prosecutions perpetuates important themes of those cases. 
 241. See Orenstein, supra note 147, at 1448 n.244 (analyzing the role of gender in the 
spousal privilege that prevented Sylvia Crawford from testifying). 
 242. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2692–93 (2008). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 2692.  To be fair, the dissent reads forfeiture more broadly but never intended 
to dispense with Crawford. See id. at 2696 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 245. Id. at 2693 (majority opinion). 
 246. In fact, Jeffrey L. Fisher, an attorney who argued Davis before the Supreme Court, 
suggests the Court has simply revived the doctrine of res gestae by focusing on the 
past/present or happening/happened elements of a situation. See generally Fisher, supra note 
8. 
 247. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006). 
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merely “describ[ing] past events,”248 or as the Court later explains the 
distinction, between “‘what is happening’” versus “‘what happened.’”249  
Davis compares “a narrative report of a crime absent any imminent danger,” 
where the interrogator seeks “simply to learn . . . what had happened in the 
past” with “a call for help against a bona fide physical threat” elicited “to 
resolve the present emergency.”250  Was the victim “seeking aid” or “telling 
a story about the past”?251  Only testimonial statements, those “not designed 
primarily to ‘establis[h] or prov[e]’ some past fact, but to describe current 
circumstances requiring police assistance” trigger the Sixth Amendment 
confrontation right.252 
Justice Scalia’s analysis in Davis parallels directly the question in 
Bedingfield where Chief Justice Cockburn analyzed the scope of an 
incident.  When did the event begin?  When did it end?  These are crucial 
questions for English res gestae doctrine in 1879 and no less so for the 
United States Supreme Court in 2006.  Chief Justice Cockburn explained in 
the Bedingfield opinion that Rudd’s cry “was not part of anything done, or 
something said while something was being done, but something said after 
something done.”253  By contrast, a statement uttered “at the time the act 
was being done would be admissible, as, for instance, if she had been heard 
to say something, as ‘Don’t, Harry!’  But here it was something stated by 
her after it was all over . . . and after the act was completed.”254 
Chief Justice Cockburn also focused on the question of ongoing 
emergency, explaining: 
If a party assailed should succeed in escaping from the immediate attack 
and presence of his assailant, and should, while apprehending immediate 
danger, make a declaration in his flight, with a view to obtaining 
assistance, such declaration would be admissible, but not so if the 
declaration were made after all pursuit or danger had ceased.255 
In his critique of Chief Justice Cockburn’s opinion in Bedingfield, John 
Pitt Taylor suggested that timing did not matter “so long as the woman was 
giving alarm and seeking for assistance.”256  Even if she knew that 
Bedingfield was no longer able to inflict harm, her statement would be part 
of the res gestae, according to Taylor, if Rudd were seeking help in having 
her throat bound up. 
These issues of defining the scope of an event, delineating the timing, 
and determining whether the emergency is ongoing, all raised in 
Bedingfield’s res gestae discussion, continue to confound current 
confrontation jurisprudence.  As it turns out, we are still puzzling over 
 
 248. Id. (citations omitted). 
 249. Id. at 830. 
 250. Id. at 827. 
 251. Id. at 831. 
 252. Id. at 827 (alteration in original) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 
(2004)). 
 253. R v. Bedingfield, (1879) 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 341 (Crown Ct.) at 342 (Eng.). 
 254. Id. at 342–43. 
 255. COCKBURN, supra note 111, at 20. 
 256. PITT TAYLOR, supra note 112, at 8. 
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questions similar to those raised in Bedingfield but we have substituted one 
incomprehensible phrase (“res gestae”) for another (“testimonial”).  As 
scholars and practitioners are discovering, this concept of “testimonial” 
statements is unfortunately equally opaque and unworkable.  The problem 
is not merely that intent of declarants, timing of declarations, and scope of 
events are notoriously slippery to define—all of which are true.  The 
problem is further confounded by the insensitivity to context and the 
realities of domestic violence. 
B.  The Mismatch Between Rigid Doctrinal Approaches and the Realities of 
Domestic Violence 
Looking carefully at Bedingfield and the three modern confrontation 
cases that involved domestic violence—Davis, Hammon, and Giles—we 
can trace the disconnect between our psycho-social understanding of 
domestic violence on the one hand, and Chief Justice Cockburn’s 
conception of res gestae and the current Court’s confrontation 
jurisprudence on the other.  The new confrontation standard, as well as the 
old res gestae approach, divide victims’ statements into neat but fairly 
useless categories of “testimonial/action is over” versus “emergency-
based/event” is ongoing.  A critique of this dualism probably holds true for 
every type of violent crime, where elimination of danger and prosecution of 
wrongdoers may be twin motivations of both the victims and the police.  
The line is particularly hard to draw, however, in domestic violence cases, 
and the Court demonstrates its insensitivity to the experiences of domestic-
battery victims, and hostility to any special treatment for such cases. 
Where there is a sustained pattern of violence and the dynamic of the 
relationship is marked by an ongoing struggle for dominance and control, 
the victim may live in constant fear.  A woman who reports to the police 
may feel genuinely fearful as she does so.  Indeed, the fact of making a 
report places her in significantly greater danger.257  Therefore, the 
distinction between reporting out of fear “to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency”258 and reporting to instigate a legal response 
“to establish or prove past events”259 makes little psychological or practical 
sense. 
Commentators have demonstrated and bemoaned the mismatch between 
the Supreme Court’s approach to confrontation and the realities of 
prosecuting domestic violence.  Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer forcefully 
argues that the Court’s constricted notion in Davis of an ongoing 
emergency fails to account for the dynamics of intimate partner violence or 
the reality experienced by its victims.260  She explains that from a battered 
 
 257. See supra note 223 and accompanying text (discussing increased danger when 
women try to leave violent relationships or attempt to seek legal remedies). 
 258. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Deborah Tuerkheimer, A Relational Approach to the Right of Confrontation and Its 
Loss, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 725, 726 (2007) (arguing that the Court’s understanding of domestic 
violence is “sufficiently inaccurate as to fatally undermine the coherence of both doctrine 
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woman’s perspective, the meaning of “‘exigency’—a construct deeply 
embedded in the now-reigning definition of testimonial—is distinct from 
that experienced by victims of other types of crimes.”261  The Court’s 
distinct, binary purposes for making a statement—“crying for help” versus 
“providing information”—are practically and conceptually inseverable.262  
As Tuerkheimer explains, for women who experience domestic violence the 
line between past and present violence is not a bright or distinct one; in 
talking to police, victims are indeed addressing an emergency, even if they 
employ past events to explain the history of continuing violence or to 
explain their fear.263  Therefore, “a domestic violence victim’s safety may 
be wholly contingent on her communication with police; her ‘narration of 
events’ linked inexorably to resolving—however temporarily—the danger 
posed by her batterer.”264  Similarly, Tuerkheimer criticizes the insistence 
on the existence of a discrete event, noting that under the Court’s new 
definition, “‘events’ have either happened or ‘are actually happening’.”265 
In his comments on Davis and Giles, Justice Scalia is near apoplectic at 
the suggestion that domestic violence cases be treated differently from other 
crimes.  Scalia does not address the hard truth that what is testimonial is an 
inherently difficult and subtle determination with regard to domestic 
violence.  He acknowledges the importance of context of domestic violence 
briefly and only for determining forfeiture, not in adding any nuance to the 
definition of “testimonial”266 or sophistication in how it is applied.  The 
entire jurisprudence, though steeped in history and justified by an appeal to 
originalism, essentially devolves into inflexible categories replete with 
dualistic thinking.  Short on nuance and hostile to issues of policy, Scalia’s 
world divides all out-of-court statements into two categories:  testimonial 
and nontestimonial.  To determine which category an out-of-court statement 
 
and theory”).  Tuerkheimer argues that the Court’s understanding of what constitutes an 
emergency must be expanded to take account of ongoing domestic violence situations like 
that in Hammon. Id. at 726–27.  She argues that the test for “testimonial statements” 
incorporates “a model of discrete, episodic violence that is incompatible with the ongoing 
nature of abuse” and reveals “complete inattention to the dynamics of battering.” Id. at 727–
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 261. Id. at 728 (footnote omitted). 
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 265. Id. at 734. 
 266. In Giles, Justice Scalia did acknowledge the domestic violence context as important 
in evaluating witness intimidation for the forfeiture question.  This one concession to the 
context of the case is out of character with the rest of his opinions, and at least one 
commentator believes it reflects an attempt to get liberal Justices on board. Tom Lininger, 
The Sound of Silence:  Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing Their Victims, 87 TEX. 
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fits into, we must again engage in the type of binary thinking that Chief 
Justice Cockburn applied in Bedingfield.  If the emergency is ongoing and 
the declarant is seeking help, then the statement is part of the res gestae and 
nontestimonial; if the crisis is over and she is merely reporting a crime, then 
it is not part of those things done that are intimately bound up with the 
statement, excluding it from the res gestae and making it testimonial. 
The Davis Court repeatedly refers to its inquiry as “objective.”267  For 
instance, it explains:  “The question before us in Davis, then, is whether, 
objectively considered, the interrogation that took place in the course of the 
911 call produced testimonial statements.”268  In responding to the dissent, 
Justice Scalia reminds Justice Thomas and all other readers “that our 
holding is not an ‘exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements—
or even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogation,’ but 
rather a resolution of the cases before us and those like them.  For those 
cases, the test is objective and quite ‘workable.’”269  In a similar vein, the 
formality of the declarant’s statement in Crawford made the testimonial 
quality “more objectively apparent.”270  Later in the opinion Justice Scalia 
concludes of the Hammon facts:  “Objectively viewed, the primary, if not 
indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible 
crime—which is, of course, precisely what the officer should have 
done.”271  Even Justice Thomas in dissent cannot help noting the “Court’s 
repeated invocation of the word ‘objectiv[e]’ to describe its test.”272 
The emphasis on objectivity is a red flag for anyone concerned with the 
rights and interests of women.  Feminist jurisprudence is skeptical about 
appeals to neutrality and objectivity, which often unthinkingly promote a 
male archetype as the norm and treat women who do not fit that norm as the 
irrational other.273  Modern feminism, which is devoted to respecting 
women’s voices and experience, has developed methods for unveiling 
gender implications of rules that appear to be neutral or claim to be 
objective.274  Reliance on self-proclaimed objectivity can serve to ignore 
the effects of rules on women; it often masks deep insensitivity to the 
particular experiences of women. 
More troubling and more pervasive throughout the analyses of Davis, 
Hammon, and Giles, is the extent to which Justice Scalia reveals himself to 
be unaware of and uninterested in the dynamics of domestic violence.  This 
lack of understanding affects not only the test itself (differentiating a cry for 
help during ongoing emergency from a report to police about a completed 
crime), but also the application of the test.  In assessing the facts of 
Hammon, Justice Scalia misses major cues that Amy Hammon, whose 
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 268. Id. 
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THEORY:  READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 370, 371 (1991). 
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statement he deems testimonial because, according to him, the emergency is 
over, is actually still in danger when she talks with police.  The facts of the 
case indicate that the accused repeatedly tried to interrupt Amy Hammon’s 
conversation with police—trying to coach her answers, interfere with her 
ability to report, and control her behavior.  Amy Hammon also reported that 
the accused broke the phone and “[t]ore up my van where I couldn’t leave 
the house.”275  This classic domineering and isolating behavior—without 
phone or transportation she is stuck at home and cannot escape or seek 
aid—indicates that Amy Hammon was still in danger (in some ways much 
more so than the victim in Davis, whose assailant had already run off).  A 
willingness to understand the particular facets of a domestic violence 
emergency is essential to any fair application of the new confrontation test.  
Appeals to objectivity miss the mark.   
C.  Strategies for Hearing the Voices and Respecting the Wishes of 
Domestic-Violence Victims 
Bedingfield and the confrontation cases have some interesting 
commonalities beyond their doctrinal similarities.  They reflect larger 
patterns in their underlying factual circumstances, the social backdrop 
against which these facts occur, and the legal discourse surrounding them.  
Reading Bedingfield today reminds us of the intractability of domestic 
violence and the challenges of prosecuting it.  It is unsettling to encounter a 
tale of domestic violence from 1879 that reads as if grabbed from today’s 
headlines.  Rudd’s story is an eerily familiar one, replete with verbal abuse, 
alcohol, and, ultimately, murder when she tries to break off the relationship.  
This violent pattern of the jilted man who first murders the object of his 
unattainable desire, and then, clumsily and ineffectually, tries to kill 
himself, resonates with modern readers, as do Rudd’s unheeded pleas for 
police protection before her fatal attack.  Today, perhaps Rudd would have 
picked up the phone to dial 911, and perhaps her lover would have used a 
gun rather than a razor.  Otherwise, however, the underlying story of the 
Bedingfield case sadly is recognizable to us today.  Rather than merely 
bemoan the fact that we seem to have made little progress in 130 years, we 
should view the familiarity of Bedingfield’s facts as an invitation to 
acknowledge the challenges and problems of proof in cases that involve 
violence between intimates. 
Bedingfield inspires important questions about gender that illuminate our 
modern confrontation cases.  In various ways, the women of Davis, 
Hammon, and Giles remain like Eliza Bedingfield in 1879:  unheard.276  
 
 275. Davis, 547 U.S. at 820. 
 276. Arguably, Sylvia Crawford also remains unheard as well because her testimony was 
excluded by the spousal testimonial privilege.  I do not include Crawford in this discussion 
because Sylvia Crawford was not the victim in the case and suffered no violence at the hands 
of her accused husband.  Although her out-of-court statement was effectively silenced, there 
are strong indications that she did not wish her statement to be used.  Sylvia’s statement to 
the police included her belief that her husband Michael is “‘one of the most fair people 
you’ll ever meet’ and that he was her ‘best friend.’” State v. Crawford, No. 25307-1-II, 2001 
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Rudd is not even named in the official court opinion.  Her last words, 
naming her murderer, are silenced by the official opinion.277  They do not 
aid in convicting her killer.  As understood by the Bedingfield court, the 
rigors of evidence law preclude us from hearing her.  However, expert 
testimony—the voice of men, professionals, science, and authority—is 
welcomed in the courtroom.  Those voices secure Bedingfield’s conviction. 
As I have noted elsewhere, the term “declarant” is an antiseptic legalistic 
word that serves to dehumanize and neuter the speaker.278  It helps us forget 
the context of male violence against intimate partners and focus on the 
acontextual evidence puzzle of determining which statements are 
testimonial.  Aside from forfeiture, narrowly understood to encompass only 
intentional attempts by the accused to make the witnesses unavailable, the 
new jurisprudence does not inquire or care about why the victim did not 
testify. 
What if, instead, we were to affirmatively notice the domestic violence 
context; what would a feminist analysis add to our understanding?  A 
feminist approach would express interest and concern about the victim’s 
desires and personal understanding of her situation. 
Obviously, the central focus of confrontation must be the right of the 
accused, not the victim’s desires.  But the Confrontation Clause can 
encompass multiple values and interests; it is only Justice Scalia’s recent 
approach that has marginalized every concern except the historic common-
law approach.  Crawford’s originalist approach is wrong-headed not only 
because of the mounting evidence that Justice Scalia misperceived the 
historical record,279 but because his narrow view does not account for other 
important values and actors involved in the confrontation process.   
In Maryland v. Craig,280 a case in 1990, the Court acknowledged the 
concerns of victims in the confrontation process, permitting the use of one-
way, closed-circuit television to display a witness’s testimony despite the 
absence of eye contact between the witness and the accused.281  Craig 
found that the child-witness testifying about abuse would suffer trauma if 
she had to look at the accused.282  The Court approved of Maryland’s 
procedure by which the six-year-old girl testified in a room with only the 
 
WL 850119, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. July 30, 2001).  Additionally, Sylvia Crawford was a 
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prosecutor, defense attorney, camera operators and a person to provide 
moral support for the child.283  The judge and the accused were in the 
courtroom watching the testimony on television, and the accused could 
communicate with his attorney.284  The Craig Court declared that the right 
of the accused to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute.285  Writing for 
the majority, Justice O’Connor explained:  “The central concern of the 
Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a 
criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an 
adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.”286  Arguing from this policy 
of reliability (a perfectly appropriate approach pre-Crawford under Ohio v. 
Roberts), Justice O’Connor held that the purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause were satisfied by the witness’s physical presence, oath, subjection to 
cross-examination, and by the availability of demeanor evidence.287  The 
Sixth Amendment established a “preference for face-to-face confrontation 
at trial;”288 however, this preference “‘must occasionally give way to 
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.’”289  Justice 
Scalia abhorred the result and reasoning of Craig, but it has not yet been 
overruled.290  Craig’s reliance on Roberts makes it seem doomed, and most 
commentators believe that it will be reversed in light of Crawford.291  
However, recent case law has upheld Craig despite Crawford challenges.292  
Craig reminds us that it is valuable to at least notice the effect on victims 
and attempt to understand cases where the accused do not wish to testify. 
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A key issue in harkening to the voices of women relates to the question 
of agency.  Given the fraught dynamics of violent intimate relationships, it 
will sometimes be difficult to know when a woman truly does not wish to 
press charges, when circumstances (such as finances, family ties, 
reputation) create pressure not to testify, or when direct threats conspire to 
render her silent.  In Davis, it was uncertain what the victim wanted.  The 
victim in Davis had secured a no-contact order against the accused, 
indicating that the accused had previously threatened her and she had 
sought legal help.  However, the facts indicate that the victim did not desire 
to testify against her former boyfriend.  She hung up when she originally 
called 911 and only spoke to the dispatcher when the dispatcher called 
back.293  She also covered her face when the police attempted to 
photograph her injuries.294  Although the victim “initially cooperated with 
the prosecutor’s office, the State was unable to locate [the victim] at the 
time of trial.”295  We do not know whether she was disinterested, afraid of 
the accused, or hoped not to get him in trouble. 
Amy Hammon seems easier to figure out.  She remained married to the 
accused.  Although she was subpoenaed by the prosecutor, she failed to 
appear at trial.296  In fact, she wrote the court regarding the accused’s 
sentencing: 
In answer to your letter there has been no damages or bills.  As for 
sentencing, I would like my husband, Hershel Hammon, to receive 
counceling [sic] and go to AA, because it has helped him in the past.  I 
would like to see him put on probation to ensure that it happens and 
where he can still work to help financially and be here to help with our 
children.  I also need his help around the house for we’re remodeling the 
house and plan to sell it so we can move out of town.  I love my husband, 
I just want to see him stop drinking.  I do not feel threatened by his 
presence.297 
From a practical and policy perspective, the failure to inquire why the 
accused is unavailable (other than focusing on the intent of the accused to 
make her so) seems odd.  The need for the statement is greatest when the 
victim is physically unable to testify because of illness or death.  That a 
victim (one who is not prevented by the accused) affirmatively chooses not 
to testify raises some additional arguments opposing admission of the 
evidence.  Although the crime is against the state, and is not the private 
right of an individual citizen, there may be good reasons to hesitate to use 
the evidence of a reluctant absent witness.  If the victim is ambivalent or 
opposed to testifying, it seems less fair to use her testimony.  Arguably, part 
of the ambivalence could be because the victim was untruthful or she 
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otherwise cannot stand by her prior statements.  It could also be because the 
victim has changed her mind or calculated her chances for long-term safety 
are worse if she testifies. 
If the accused directly threatens her or otherwise procures the witness’s 
absence, then Giles clearly provides a forfeiture theory for admitting the 
victim’s statements.  Given the nature of domestic violence, which is often 
marked by hyper-vigilance to the moods and needs of the batterer and 
regular accommodations to mollify him, applying the Giles standard will be 
tricky.  Intimidation can take many forms, and courts will need to be aware 
that not only physical force, but also credible threats to harm the victim or 
her children, or to separate the victim from them will count as the type of 
intimidation that should trigger forfeiture.  Justice Scalia recognized that 
violent acts 
often are intended to dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help, and 
include conduct designed to prevent testimony to police officers or 
cooperation in criminal prosecutions.  Where such an abusive relationship 
culminates in murder, the evidence may support a finding that the crime 
expressed the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting 
abuse to the authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution—
rendering her prior statements admissible under the forfeiture doctrine.298 
In his concurrence in part, Justice David H. Souter opened the door for an 
expansive interpretation of intentionally procuring absence in domestic 
violence cases.  He opined that “the element of intention would normally be 
satisfied by the intent inferred on the part of the domestic abuser in the 
classic abusive relationship, which is meant to isolate the victim from 
outside help, including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial 
process.”299  Justice Souter explained:  “If the evidence for admissibility 
shows a continuing relationship of this sort, it would make no sense to 
suggest that the oppressing defendant miraculously abandoned the 
dynamics of abuse the instant before he killed his victim, say in a fit of 
anger.”300 
Professor Tom Lininger has suggested a standard for evaluating when an 
accused intentionally renders a witness unavailable.  He has tailored his 
practical guidelines to the realities of domestic violence.  He proposes that 
courts find “the requisite intent where the defendant has violated a 
restraining order, committed any act of violence while judicial proceedings 
are pending, or engaged in a prolonged pattern of abusing and isolating the 
victim.”301  This very sensible and practical approach has much to 
recommend in terms of preventing batterers from intimidating their intimate 
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 300. Id. 
 301. Lininger, supra note 266, at 865.  Intimidation can take many forms, and courts will 
need to be aware that not only physical force, but credible threats to harm the victim, harm 
the victim’s children, or separation of the victim from her children, will count as the type of 
intimidation that should trigger forfeiture. Id. at 868–69. 
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partners.  It works particularly well in cases like Giles where the witness is 
dead. 
By assuming duress under such broad circumstances, however, Lininger 
arguably undermines rather than respects some victims’ choices.  
Essentially, Lininger’s approach presents another venue in which to debate 
the wisdom and underlying assumptions of no-drop policies.  His criteria 
for finding forfeiture may ignore the victim’s perspective and her agency in 
the interest of securing a conviction.  A live victim’s desire not to testify 
could be an informed and deliberate silence that arguably should be 
honored.  One potential danger with Lininger’s innovative and otherwise 
admirable approach is that it not only sacrifices confrontation, but also may 
do so in direct opposition to the wishes and grim experiences of the victim 
who made the statement. 
Such concerns do not arise in cases like Giles or Bedingfield where the 
victims were not uncooperative, but instead suffered the ultimate 
unavailability:  death.  Here I favor entirely the Lininger proposal that 
essentially allows the victim to speak from the grave.  This seems 
particularly fair (and forfeiture is after all an equitable remedy) where the 
accused himself rendered the victim unconfrontable.  Giles rejected a 
forfeiture standard triggered merely by the accused’s killing the victim and 
insisted that the accused must have intended to procure the witness’ 
absence.302  In addition to its historical arguments about the scope of 
forfeiture, the majority in Giles was concerned that judges would have to 
predetermine guilt to apply the law of forfeiture.303  As the Court explained:  
“The notion that judges may strip the defendant of a right that the 
Constitution deems essential to a fair trial, on the basis of a prior judicial 
assessment that the defendant is guilty as charged, does not sit well with the 
right to trial by jury.”304  In Giles, however, such a preliminary 
determination would not have been onerous or intrusive.  Giles readily 
admitted to killing the victim,305 but claimed self-defense.  By contrast, 
Bedingfield did not admit to killing Rudd.  In terms of fairness, there is a 
certain basic fairness in admitting Avie’s statement in Giles, since Giles 
himself does not contest that his own act (however justifiable in his version 
of events) rendered her unavailable.  If Bedingfield were to be believed, 
however, he was not the source of Rudd’s unavailability; she committed 
suicide.  This distinction is important and Bedingfield’s facts illustrate that 
Giles was arguably wrongly decided and that the court could have adopted a 
narrow forfeiture doctrine where the accused admits killing and rendering 
the victim forever silent. 
 
 302. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2688. 
 303. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.  This sort of preliminary determination 
of an ultimate fact happens all the time under Federal Rule of Evidence 104. See, e.g., 
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987). 
 304. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2686. 
 305. He couldn’t have done otherwise, since his “niece and grandmother ran outside and 
saw Giles standing near Avie with a gun in his hand.” Id. at 2681. 
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Another commonality between Bedingfield and Giles is the defendant’s 
strategy of blaming the victim.  Giles’s claim of self-defense is similar to 
the sort of chutzpah displayed by Bedingfield who claimed that Rudd 
attempted murder and that he was merely the unsuspecting victim sitting on 
her lap.  In Bedingfield, because of the party-witness rule, the accused was 
unable to take the stand in his own defense; allowing the unconfronted and 
uncontradicted voice from the grave seemed unfair.  In Giles, the accused 
had the opportunity to testify; only the victim was silenced, unable to use 
her former statements to refute his version of events. 
This distinction between Giles and Bedingfield highlights the 
anachronistic and acontextual character of Justice Scalia’s approach.  There 
is no acknowledgment in Giles that for the historical cases on which the 
opinion rested, criminal defendants were not permitted to testify at all.  
Therefore, allowing the absent victim’s statements into evidence seemed 
particularly unfair.  With the abolition of the party-witness rule in the mid-
nineteenth century, the accused was allowed to take the witness stand in his 
own defense, and the fairness calculus, particularly in situations of 
forfeiture, might reasonably come out differently.  Indeed, Justice Scalia’s 
atomized, acontextual originalism is problematic because so much has 
changed not only in society306 but also in evidence procedure.  Even Chief 
Justice Cockburn indicated that if the limitations on the testimony of the 
accused were ever lifted, he might support introduction of the statement of 
the absent victim.307 
The current relationship between confrontation jurisprudence and 
domestic violence is fraught not only with insensitivity and misapplied 
history, but also with paradox and terrible consequences.  As Justice Breyer 
observed in dissent, the Giles ruling “creates evidentiary anomalies and 
aggravates existing evidentiary incongruities”;308 it gives batterers a great 
benefit for killing their victims instead of just injuring them (which would 
allow them to testify later).309  Similarly, Professor Lininger cites the 
paradox of Giles that “the more the criminal justice system insists upon live 
testimony by the accuser, the less likely it is that she will actually appear in 
court.”310  The accused, who already is engaging in a struggle for 
dominance and control over his partner, will become aware that the 
prosecution cannot proceed without the victim’s testimony.  Lininger 
argues persuasively that this will increase witness tampering.311  Justice 
 
 306. See Raeder, supra note 217, at 312 (“Crawford’s originalist approach eschews the 
question of what the founding fathers would have thought of a world that espouses zero 
tolerance for domestic violence, one in which 911 protocols are routine, as are pro- or 
mandatory-arrest policies, no-drop prosecutions, criminal contempt convictions for violation 
of protective orders, expansive hearsay exceptions and in some states reporting requirements 
for medical personnel.  Instead, under Crawford, the confrontation right looks backward, not 
forward.”). 
 307. See supra note 111. 
 308. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2699 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 309. Id. 
 310. Lininger, supra note 266, at 871. 
 311. Id. 
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Scalia, however, has made perfectly clear that any such practical 
concerns—about the ability to prosecute, the potential dangers witnesses 
might face, or the cost/benefit analysis of insisting that the accused show 
up—are out of bounds when it comes to the command of confrontation. 
Justice Scalia may not like special rules for domestic violence cases, but 
the violence between intimate partners is not the same as a garden-variety 
assault.  A relationship that is structured around the abuser’s dominance and 
control is, de facto, different, and cannot be equated with random or 
opportunistic violence.  The messy aspects of relationships defy Scalia’s 
inflexible and uniform definitions. 
Ironically, the new confrontation jurisprudence will often correlate 
negatively with domestic-violence victims’ desires about whether to 
participate in their batterers’ prosecution.  The Constitution, as divined by 
Crawford, treats each statement in a manner exactly the opposite of the 
declarant’s desires. 
In Giles, it is fair to conjecture that Avie would have liked her 
statements, made weeks before her death, to be used in prosecuting her 
murderer.  She made the effort to report Giles’s threats and violence to 
police and clearly expected her report to be used against him.  The 
unconfronted testimonial statement of Avie is excluded—even though there 
is little question that she would have desired its admission, and tragically 
her wishes carry less weight now that she is no longer alive.  At the risk of 
infuriating Justice Scalia, I also note that such statements, recorded by law 
enforcement and often reduced to writings that are signed by the victim, are 
more reliable than excited statements made to friends and bystanders in 
moments of anxiety and extreme agitation.  Ironically, such victims’ 
statements to police—formal testimonial statements that are most likely to 
represent the wishes and intent of the victim and that are most likely to be 
reliable—are the least likely to be admitted, under the new Crawford 
jurisprudence. 
By contrast, it seems that the victims in Davis and Hammon may not 
have wished their statements to be used; they just needed police assistance.  
At least some victims’ advocates would support honoring that wish.  The 
Court has made clear that off-hand comments to friends do not run afoul of 
the Confrontation Clause and all such nontestimonial statements are outside 
the purview of constitutional protection. 
IV.  REVISITING THE CRUCIAL QUESTION OF RELIABILITY:  THE 
UNFAIRNESS TO THE ACCUSED OF CRAWFORD’S LIMITED “TESTIMONIAL” 
APPROACH 
Applying the facts of Bedingfield to the Court’s new jurisprudence is an 
edifying, if somewhat demoralizing, exercise.  On a purely doctrinal level, 
Rudd’s statement, “O, aunt, etc.” does not qualify as testimonial.  When 
Rudd supposedly made her famous statement, it was to a friend 
immediately after receiving a mortal injury.  She did not appear to be 
calling for the police, or even asking anyone to transmit an accusation to the 
authorities.  There is no reason to suppose that Rudd expected her statement 
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to be used in a legal proceeding.  Her case would seem to present only 
hearsay issues, and Crawford has made clear that confrontation is distinct 
from hearsay.312  
Post-Crawford, a lively debate ensued among evidence scholars over 
whether any constitutional protection remained for nontestimonial 
statements.313  Davis, however, has put the debate to rest.  Davis explains: 
A critical portion of [Crawford], and the portion central to resolution of 
the two cases now before us, is the phrase ‘testimonial statements.’  Only 
statements of this sort cause the declarant to be a ‘witness’ within the 
meaning of the Confrontation Clause.  It is the testimonial character of the 
statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to 
traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the 
Confrontation Clause.314 
The new confrontation jurisprudence clearly indicates that statements such 
as the one Rudd allegedly made present no constitutional question.  
Although many have focused on the new exclusions under Crawford, it is 
worthwhile to take note of how many unconfronted out-of-court statements 
no longer present any constitutional question whatsoever, and are relegated 
to the vagaries of hearsay law.315 
In fact, in Giles, Scalia attempted to mollify those concerned with the 
exclusion of the dead victim’s statement that the new approach would not 
cripple domestic violence prosecutions because most statements will not 
fall under the testimonial rubric.  Giles observed that “only testimonial 
statements are excluded by the Confrontation Clause.  Statements to friends 
and neighbors about abuse and intimidation, and statements to physicians in 
the course of receiving treatment would be excluded, if at all, only by 
hearsay rules.”316  Hence the many statements of murder victims made to 
friends, doctors, etc., not uttered for the purpose of creating testimonial 
evidence against the accused, are not testimonial and receive only the 
protection of whatever hearsay rules various jurisdictions provide. 
 
 312. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). 
 313. See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Confrontation as Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure:  Crawford’s Birth Did Not Require that Roberts Had to Die, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 685 
(2007). 
 314. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006). 
 315. Lininger, supra note 108, at 326 (“Testimonial hearsay has attracted the Court’s 
attention, but the Court cannot seem to discern a constitutional role in the regulation of 
nontestimonial hearsay.”).  Concededly, the pre-Crawford approach to such evidence under 
Roberts would probably have admitted these statements as well. See supra notes 142–43 and 
accompanying text.  Roberts’s focus on reliability took an unfortunate turn whereby all 
“firmly rooted hearsay exception[s]” were presumed to bear “indicia of reliability.” Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).  Crawford rightfully decoupled confrontation from hearsay, 
but Crawford’s total inattention to reliability is problematic. 
 316. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2692–93 (2008); see id. at 2694 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“The Confrontation Clause does not apply to out-of-court statements unless it 
can be said that they are the equivalent of statements made at trial by ‘witnesses.’”); Raeder, 
supra note 217, at 324 (noting the “automatic pass” for all nontestimonial hearsay). 
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This is hardly comforting for civil libertarians who are concerned for the 
rights of the accused.317  The Court seems to be taking the Sixth 
Amendment seriously, but only in a very small range of cases, interpreting 
the clause strictly but extending confrontation’s reach exceedingly 
narrowly.318  As Professor Robert P. Mosteller has recently observed, the 
Court has “left many unreliable, incriminating, and accusatory hearsay 
statements offered against a criminal defendant admissible and unregulated, 
despite the complete absence of confrontation.”319 
Looking at the facts surrounding Rudd’s alleged statement in 
Bedingfield, it is troubling that today Rudd’s sworn statement to a police 
officer would not be admitted, but her alleged cry to a friend would present 
no Confrontation Clause problem whatsoever.  Although Bedingfield can be 
read as an indictment of silencing victims, it can also be read as a 
cautionary tale of admitting unconfronted, unreliable statements.  Current 
hearsay exceptions do not screen for trustworthiness or reliability320 and the 
excited utterance exception is considered notoriously unreliable.321  The 
current regime, hyper-focused on the dangers of testimonial statements, has 
proven totally uninterested in affording confrontation in other 
circumstances.  Given the suspicion that Rudd probably never uttered her 
famous dying phrase, it is troubling to imagine that there is no 
constitutional protection and no residual interest in reliability.322  The 
Court’s overvaluing of process, preoccupation with history, and 
 
 317. Relatedly, some critics of Davis express concern about the rights of the accused and 
argue that a judge’s discretion to identify an ongoing emergency simply reinvigorates the 
vague, manipulable, and unpredictable standards Justice Scalia claimed to eliminate in 
overruling Roberts. See, e.g., Michael D. Cicchini, Judicial (In)Discretion:  How Courts 
Circumvent the Confrontation Clause Under Crawford and Davis, 75 TENN. L. REV. 753, 
764 (2008); Lininger, supra note 108, at 280.  Feminists, who are aware of the injustices 
caused by stereotypes and stigmas, must be concerned with the rights of the accused. See 
Raeder, supra note 217, at 313–14 (“As a feminist who is also concerned about the 
defendant’s right to confrontation, I have long pondered the proper balance to ensure that the 
voices of women and children are heard, without eviscerating the ability of the defendant to 
confront live complainants, and not just second-hand witnesses.”). 
 318. Lininger, supra note 108, at 274 (noting the “lamentable asymmetry in confrontation 
law:  the right to confront declarants of testimonial hearsay was now too strong, while the 
right to confront declarants of nontestimonial hearsay was now too weak”). 
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Limited Revolution, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 675, 676 (2009); see also Davies, Not the 
Framers’ Design, supra note 141, at 350–51 (“As a practical matter, it seems likely that the 
narrow scope accorded to the confrontation right in Crawford will allow prosecutors 
considerable room to use hearsay evidence in criminal cases rather than produce the person 
who made the out-of-court statement as a trial witness, even when the person who made the 
hearsay statement is readily available to be called.”); Raeder, supra note 217, at 320 
(“Crawford opens the possibility of large amounts of hearsay receiving no constitutional 
second-look at all.”). 
 320. See Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After 
Sixteen Years—The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, The Need for an Advisory 
Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 907 n.266 (1992) (reprinted at 142 F.R.D. 519). 
 321. See generally Orenstein, supra note 99. 
 322. See Raeder, supra note 217, at 321 (“[I]t is imperative to retain a reliability review 
given a testimonial approach.”). 
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abandonment of any concern with reliability display how out of touch the 
current jurisprudence is with both the interests of victims and the rights of 
the accused. 
CONCLUSION 
Bedingfield is certainly interesting in its own right as a riveting tale, an 
evidence-law conundrum, and an historical peek into the doctrinal split 
between English and American hearsay doctrine.  Bedingfield is also 
important because it demonstrates the intractability of evidence problems 
regarding domestic violence victims.  How can we hear the voices of 
victims in a respectful way that acknowledges their agency and experience?  
How do we avoid rewarding perpetrators for silencing the intimate partners 
whom they have rendered unavailable?  How can we develop a rational, 
predictable, and principled system that admits some unconfronted out-of-
court statements, protecting both the rights of the accused and the safety of 
the victim? 
Because three of the recent confrontation cases involve domestic 
violence with female victims as the star no-show witnesses, women have 
played a prominent, if unsought role in the Supreme Court’s new 
confrontation jurisprudence.  In addition to looking at the problem 
doctrinally, therefore, it is important to realize that these confrontation cases 
involve social phenomena, where the women’s identity and stories often 
become lost in the shuffle.  There is a danger that these victims will be 
voiceless, and their concerns will be ignored.  We can rightfully question 
the ability of courts to address the complicated dynamics of domestic 
violence, as long as they adhere to the rigid Crawford framework.  We can 
also challenge the reported case law for its failure to capture the richness of 
the facts and the effect of domestic violence on women’s lives, and instead 
use these personal tragedies as an opportunity for an extended history 
lesson, abstract constitutional exegesis, and debate over doctrine.  Nowhere 
in Justice Scalia’s doctrinal complexity is there room to consider the wishes 
of the victim, whose cry for protection in time of crisis may later be used to 
enhance the power of the state against her intimate partner. 
Finally, Bedingfield teaches us that rigid categories are unhelpful and 
failure to inquire about reliability can undermine truth-seeking and severely 
prejudice the accused.  No one is served by the false dichotomies upon 
which Crawford and its progeny rely.  Victims find their situations 
caricatured and grafted onto ill-fitting categories.  Procedural fairness has 
triumphed so absolutely as the dominant value in confrontation that no one 
dare ask whether any substantive fairness results.  The forbidden question 
of reliability—while subjective, complex, potentially gendered in its own 
right, and certainly poorly applied under Roberts—is nevertheless a valid 
and compelling goal of evidence law.  We must design a more rational, 
real-world system for deciding which out-of-court statements are admitted 
despite the lack of confrontation. 
Unconfronted statements by victims of domestic violence are truly 
problematic for evidence law—but not for the reasons Justice Scalia 
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imagines.  The value to the prosecution, the unfairness to the accused, and 
the potential for either value or danger for the victim indicate that such 
statements pose complicated evidentiary, constitutional, and policy 
problems that cannot be resolved by resort to facile and rigid categories.  
Crawford performed an important service by decoupling confrontation from 
hearsay and encouraging us to take the Sixth Amendment seriously.  By 
insisting on unworkable categories of dubious historical legacy and by 
reading the term testimonial to apply so narrowly, however, Crawford has 
rendered the Confrontation Clause irrelevant in many situations.  Ironically, 
one of the key areas where Crawford will insulate the accused from 
evidence is when women seek help from police to stop the violence in their 
homes.  Paradoxically, the more a woman affirmatively tries to seek legal 
redress, the less her voice will be heard in the courtroom.  Shouts of fear or 
requests for help during a battering episode (where the woman may just 
wish to be safe and does not wish to create evidence against the accused) 
will, however, not be subject to any constitutional screen. 
The Roberts test was broken, but Crawford has offered us the wrong fix.  
Given Crawford and its progeny, there is nothing short of expanding 
forfeiture and dying declarations that scholars can propose to expand the 
admissibility of testimonial statements.  To address the fact that no 
constitutional protection exists for the many nontestimonial statements 
uttered by victims, the law of evidence will have to rely on hearsay rules.323  
In doing so, it perhaps can do what Crawford studiously avoids—thinking 
about reliability, fairness, and hearing the voices of victims. 
 
 
 323. See Lininger, supra note 108, at 308. 
